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This study examines the relationship between the composition of the board
of directors, director liability, the firm's performance and shareholder wealth. The
existence of a director liability crisis is first examined. Both anecdotal and
empirical evidence suggest that such a crisis did indeed occur. The evidence also
suggests that the "crisis" primarily hurt firms that were performing poorly.
To verify the existence of a "crisis" and to gain insight into the effect
director resignations have on firm value, a sample of firms, where more than one
director resigned at the same time, is collected. This sample spans the period
when it is hypothesized that a crisis occurred and the period following the "crisis".
As predicted, shareholders response to directors resignations are significantly
different during these two periods. During the "crisis" years the resignation of
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directors results in a loss to firm value for all firms. The magnitude of the loss is
directly related to firm performance. Alternatively, following the "crisis", the
relationship between performance and shareholder response to the directors
resignation is inverse and not always negative. These results suggest that the
board’s composition can effect firm value and that during the "crisis" period
directors were hard to replace and therefore their resignations reduced firm value.
The more negative response from poorly performing firms suggests that for these
firms directors are especially valuable. Under normal conditions, i.e., after the
"crisis", shareholders view changes in board composition as positive events in
firms that are doing poorly, and as a negative signal from firms that are doing
well.
An examination of the event that legally eliminated the "director liability
crisis," i.e., the adoption of provisions eliminating directors' liability, provides
further evidence as to the importance of directors to poorly performing firms.
Shareholders of poorly performing firms respond positively to the adoption of
these provisions, emphasizing the importance of maintaining the integrity of the
board of directors. For other firms, this is less important and the adoption of these
provisions does not effect firm value.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Motivation
A corporation's board of directors is a governance device intended both to
monitor and guide the firm. Although there is some evidence that the board's
composition has a bearing on firm value [e.g., Weisbach (1988), Warner, Watts
and Wruck (1988), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Baysinger and Butler
(1985)] there is also the view that the board is a passive body "rubber-stamping"
the CEO's decisions [see, for example, Shaw (1989) and Lorsch and Maclver
(1989)]. These authors claim that since the chief executive officer (CEO) plays a
major role in choosing the outside directors, the board's ability to be effective
monitors is compromised. In cases where the board may be ineffective, other
governance structures that can alter directors' incentives and thus their behavior
can be important.
The takeover market is one such external (market) governance structure
that can discipline directors. Managerial neglect or misconduct is also deterred by
the markets for managerial services and directorships [Gilson (1990), Kaplan and
Riehaus (1990)] although it is unlikely that this market is completely efficient
[Williamson (1985)]. Shareholders' ability to directly remove the directors and
managers is severely limited as proxy fights are costly and difficult to win. Small
investors lack the resources or knowledge required to win such a contest, while
larger investors might find the alternative of a tender offer for the firm to be more
attractive.
1
2Another means of redress open to large and small investors is to sue the
directors or managers for inadequate performance. Managers and directors can be
held personally liable and shareholders can recover losses arising from
mismanagement. The dramatic increase in lawsuits brought against management
and directors in the 1980 s attests to the popularity of this method of disciplining
directors. Sued directors and managers suffer from potential monetary losses and
legal costs. They may have to expend time away from their main business and
may suffer the consequences of such a suit in the market for their services. Not
surprisingly, directors view fulfilling legal requirements in their daily decisions
as being very important [Lorsch and Maclver (1989), p.3B]. More significantly, as
this studyargues, the legal threat facing directors increases for firms in distress.
If firm value is affected by directors' actions that, in turn, are influenced by
the external (legal) governance structure, then firm value depends on the legal
environment surrounding directors. Further, insofar as the legal environment
facing directors varies with the firm's financial condition, directors' incentives and
hence behavior is conditional on the financial health of the firm. Examining the
interdependence between firm value, the external (legal) governance structure and
the firm's financial condition is a major purpose of this research.
To examine these issues, this study focuses on a the mid 1980s, a period
that has been labeled by the popular press, and by legal scholars as the "directors
liability crisis." During this period, the number and size of lawsuits brought
against directors skyrocketed. As a result of this increase and the legal
uncertainty that accompanied it, insurance companies dramatically increased the
cost of directors and officers liability insurance while substantially reducing its
3applicability. Thus, some companies could not afford to purchase these policies,
while for some directors the policies that were purchased did not supply adequate
protection. Directors and officers liability insurance serves an important role in
attracting outside directors to boards, an in enabling them to function
appropriately. Without the protection of these policies, the personal wealth of the
directors would be in jeopardy every time a lawsuit was filed. Because of the
increased legal threats, the cost of serving on a corporate board increased to such
a level that directors at some firms resigned, and others refused to take on new
board positions.
This study examines two events associated with this "crisis": the
resignations of directors from boards, and the adoption of provisions limiting
director liability by many companies. These events can provide evidence
regarding two issues:
1. did a crisis indeed occur?
2. what is the value that shareholders place on outside directors?
If a crisis did not occur and is just a result of "media hysteria", then the
resignations of directors during the "crisis" period should elicit the same
shareholder response as resignations during alternative periods. In addition, if the
"crisis was illusionary then the adoption of liability limitation provisions (LLPs)
that substantially reduce shareholders ability to sue directors should be viewed as
negative by shareholders. However, if a "crisis" did indeed occur, and if
shareholders value outside directors, then one would expect them to react more
negatively to directors resignations during the "crisis" than following it. During
the "crisis" these directors would be very difficult to replace. In addition, the
4adoption of LLPs would now become an issue of balance between the value of
being able to retain and attract outside directors and the value of being able to sue
them.
An additional question that this research addresses is whether the value
shareholders placed on outside directors is contingent on specific firm
characteristics, and more specifically on whether the financial condition of the
firm effects this valuation. Because of the unique role outside directors play in
firms that are in crisis, especially in firms that are financially distressed, it is
hypothesized that outside directors are more valuable to shareholders in
financially distressed firms than in healthy firms.
To test the ideas discussed above, two empirical studies are conducted.
The first examines the market's response to directors' resignations during and after
1984 through 1986, the "crisis" years. An event study is conducted for both
periods and the results are compared. In addition, for each period cross sectional
regressions are performed in an attempt to establish the relationship between the
markets response and firm-specific variables, primarily firm performance.
A second empirical test is conducted to establish the stock price response
to the announced adoption of an LLP following the "crisis" period 1984-1986.
Two main questions are addressed: To what extent do changes in the boards' legal
environment affect firm value? And, how does the firm's financial condition
(normal or poorly performing firms) influence this market reaction?
51.2 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
A sample of 86 NYSE and NASDAQ firms where at least two directors
resigned between 1984 and 1990 are identified. Of these, 47 resignations
occurred during the "crisis" years 1984-1986, and 31 occurred in the years
following it, 1988-1990. The results present evidence that suggests that there is a
significant difference in shareholders response to directors resignation during and
after the crisis. During the crisis, shareholders view directors resignations as a
significantly negative event, while in the period after the crisis these resignations
do not negatively impact shareholders wealth. These results provide evidence
consistent with the idea that a directors crisis did indeed occur, and that
shareholders value the presence of outside directors on their boards.
In addition, evidence is presented that suggests that outside directors are
especially valuable to poorly performing firms, and that when they cannot be
replaced, their resignation is viewed as significantly negative by shareholders.
During the crisis years, shareholders response to the resignations is directly
related to the firm's performance. Shareholders react more negatively to
resignations from poorly performing firms than they do to resignations from firms
that are doing comparatively well. Alternatively, in the years following the crisis
this relationship is reversed, i.e., shareholders react more negatively to
resignations from firms that are doing well than they do to resignations from
poorly performing firms. A possible explanation for this result is that resignations
from good firms provide a negative signal to the market, whereas resignations
from poorly performing firms, during times when these directors can be replaced,
6is viewed as a positive change in a faltering board. All these results are confirmed
while controlling for a variety of firm specific characteristics.
For the second empirical study, a sample of 120 firms that announced their
intent to adopt LLPs was used. For the aggregate sample, shareholders appear to
view the adoption of an LLP as benign; there was no significant market response
to this event. However, on a firm-specific level, the market reaction is clearly
different between firms and is related to firm performance measured either on a
"stock" or a "flow" basis. There is an inverse relationship between the market
excess returns and various performance measures, suggesting that external
governance is more important for firms with low economic rents or who are
performing poorly, or that for these firms the cost for outsiders of serving on the
board is large. This inverse relation is strong even after controlling for a variety of
potentially contaminating events. These results suggest that the market views
changes in the board of directors' external governance environment (the adoption
of LLPs) as being more important to poorly performing firms than to
normal/healthy firms.
1.3 Thesis Organization
Views on the importance of the board of directors and evidence with
regard to a directors' liability crisis are presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 is
devoted to a discussion of how the directors' roles change as a firm approaches
financial distress. The first empirical chapter, Chapter 4, examines the market
reactions to the resignations of directors during and after the so called liability
crisis. Chapter 5 examines the market's reaction to firms adopting provisions
7limiting their directors' liability as a response to the liability crisis. Finally,
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions and discussion of future, related research
avenues.
Chapter 2: Director Liability and the Director Liability Crisis
2.1 VIEWS ON THE ROLE AND VALUE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
In order to bridge the separation of ownership and control [Fama (1980)
and Fama and Jensen (1983)] the board of directors is established as shareholders'
representatives in monitoring managers. The American Law Institute (1982)
considers the outside director's monitoring of managers the corporate board's most
important function. They claim that only outside directors can ask the difficult
questions, and discipline managers for their mistakes.
There are many who argue that the board of directors is, for the most part,
ineffective. Demsetz (1983), Hart (1983), Shaw (1989) and Lorsch and Maclver
(1989), point to the fact that the CEO has a major influence on choosing the
directors and in controlling the agenda at board meetings of most corporations.
As Shaw (1989) puts it "It is time, indeed past the time, to discard the textbook
notion that the board of directors is chosen democratically. No one believes this,
but the myth survives. ... Loyalty to the shareholders has been displaced by
deference to the 'host' CEO." Thus, the boards ability to monitor management and
to provide it with guidance is not only limited by the fact that the officers sitting
on the board are more knowledgeable regarding the firms operations, but also
because the outside directors are often friends and associates of the CEO, hand
picked by him for the job. As one director interviewed by Lorsch and Maclver
states:
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9"I think the CEO influences the composition of the board first, and
sets the tone of what's considered on the agenda, what information
is available, how issues are dealt with in committee or by the full
board, and who is put on which committee."
These arguments lead many to the conclusion that the board of directors is
ineffective as a monitor of management and that therefore it does little to reduce
shareholder-management agency costs. According to this view outside directors,
are not independent but are the CEO's puppets and contribute very little to firm
value.
Fama and Jensen (1983), while recognizing the problems associated with
monitoring by outside directors, argue that outside directors have the appropriate
incentives to monitor effectively. They hypothesize that these directors are
motivated to develop reputations as experts in decision control. Most outside
directors are decision makers in some kind of organization, and the value of their
human capital depends on their overall performance. These directors use their
board membership to signal to the markets that they are decision experts who can
work in a decision control system. Thus, when a firm does badly or when there is
a breakdown in the effectiveness of outside directors' monitoring, the director's
human capital is devalued by the market.
Part of the difficulty in assessing the board's value is that the inside and
outside directors make differential contributions to the firm that extend well
beyond the narrow monitoring function. The CEO and the other insiders' role as
directors adds value to the company primarily because of their hands-on
involvement and intimate knowledge of the firm's operations. They are thus vital
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as suppliers of information and knowledge to outside directors who do not have
this inside information and expertise.
In addition to their monitoring function, outside directors also have a
related "guidance function": they influence the firm's choice of chief executive
officer (CEO), compensation policies, long-term strategic objectives, dividend
policies, and capital structure, to name a few. The importance of the guidance
function of outside directors is gaining increasing recognition. A recent Wall
Street Journal article reports that in the past decade, the number of boards with a
4-to-l or greater ratio of outsiders to insiders has doubled and cites as possible
reasons for this growing reliance on outsiders the need for fresh expertise, the
need to confront management with tough questions, to help thwart takeovers, to
deal with stiff global competition and to cope with the increasing threat of director
liability (Timothy D. Schellhardt, "More Directors are Recruited From the
Outside", Wall Street Journal, March 20, 1991).
It is unlikely that theoretical arguments alone can shed light on the extent
to which boards of directors are indeed effective as monitors and as providers of
guidance, this is ultimately an empirical question.
Early evidence on the board's effectiveness is almost entirely anecdotal.
The responses elicited by Mace (1986) in his interviews with managers yields
extensive evidence on their belief that outside directors are better monitors. The
following responses of business executives are illustrative:
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"The fact that you know that outsiders are going to be looking at
what you have done, and what you are doing, forces you into doing
a little better job. There is a discipline factor here ...But I think we
behave differently internally, knowing that we have outside
directors. The mere existence of outside directors makes us think a
little bit harder, makes us organize our thoughts. It sharpens up the
whole organization" (p.24, Mace).
"if a company did not have a board of outside directors, it might be
a little bit more free-wheeling, a little bit more careless, and a little
bit more lax than it would otherwise be. Knowing that they must
appear before, in a sense, their professional peers, and report on
what they in management have done, is a healthy thing for
management" (p.25, Mace).
Recent empirical research [Weisbach (1988), Warner, Watts and Wruck
(1988), Coughlan and Schmidt (1985)] is suggestive of outside directors'
monitoring function. There is an inverse relation between a firm's share
performance and the likelihood of a subsequent change in management [Weisbach
(1988), and Warner, Watts and Wruck(l9BB)] and share performance measures
are more highly correlated with CEO turnover for firms in which outside directors
dominate (Weisbach). Moreover, managerial turnover is more likely to be in firms
with a low performance record (low Tobin's q ratio) [Morck, Shliefer and Vishny
(1989)]. These authors point out that the fact that firms experiencing complete
managerial turnover are unlikely to be run by a member of a founding family or
by a powerful Boss (an executive who holds one of the key positions in the
corporation, Chairman, President, or CEO, and is the sole signer of the letter to
shareholders in the annual report) provides further evidence regarding the role of
outside directors.
These studies are further supported by anecdotal evidence that boards of
directors have recently been actively involved in replacing CEOs at some of the
12
largest US corporations. Major articles in Fortune (January 11, 1993) and Forbes
(January 3, 1994) describe the ouster of more than a dozen CEOs of major
corporations. These articles stress the important role that outside directors on the
boards of these companies played in these events.
While the empirical evidence presented above provides strong evidence in
support of the monitoring role of outside directors it is important to consider other
factors that are significant. The inverse relation between share performance and
turnover and between turnover and Tobin's q might be due to factors other than
the board of directors. There is evidence of large blockholders' involvement in
forced CEO departures (Warner, Watts and Wruck) and of creditors' involvement
in removing managers in poorly-performing firms [Gilson (1988)].
Notwithstanding the superior monitoring role of outside directors
suggested in his interviews, Mace puts more emphasis on directors' guidance
function. He believes that the outside directors' primary contributions to the firm
are through the prestige they bring to the company and their help in devising long-
term strategies, establishing personal relationships and advising the firm from new
perspectives. Recent empirical evidence is consistent with the view that guidance
has value. Outsiders are more likely to join a board after a firm performs poorly
or leaves the industry [Hermalin and Weisbach (1989)], suggesting that new
guidance is required as the company shifts its focus. There is also evidence that
outside directors play an important role in evaluating bank takeovers [Brickley
and James (1987)]. In any case, the guidance and monitoring functions of
directors are intertwined and difficult to separate.
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Two recent studies [Byrd and Hickman (1992) and Brickley, Coles and
Terry (1993)] provide additional evidence in support of the idea that boards are
valuable monitors and providers of guidance. Examining 128 tender offer bids
from 1980 through 1987, Byrd and Hickman find that firms where over 50% of
the board's members are independent directors have significantly higher abnormal
returns surrounding the announcement of a takeover bid, than do other firms.
Thus, they conclude that shareholders in firms with a majority of independent
directors on their boards believe that these directors monitor management
decisions on behalf of shareholders and do not let management take on bad
takeover attempts. It is also consistent with the view that outsiders provide
valuable guidance to managers in formulating a takeover strategy. In any case,
the results provide evidence as to the value of independent directors and to their
ability to work in shareholders best interests.
Brickley, Coles and Terry (1993) find that the average stock market
reaction to the adoption of a poison pill is positive for firms whose boards' have a
majority of independent directors and negative for firms whose boards' do not.
They also find that the probability that a subsequent contest is associated with an
auction is also positively related to the fraction of outside directors on the board.
Thus, shareholders believe that if a board, with a majority of independent
directors, passes a poison pill amendment, it is in shareholder's best interest.
These result are consistent with the results of Byrd and Hickman (1992) and with
the idea that outside directors do serve the best interests of shareholders by
monitoring management decisions.
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Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find that the appointment of outside directors
is, on average, greeted favorably by the market. While this imputes a positive
economic role to outside directors' guidance and/or monitoring function, the
evidence is also consistent with the hypothesis that the firm's appointment of an
outside director merely signals to the marketplace a change in strategy, having
little to do with the outsider's value. Thus, it is unclear which effect is the primary
contributor to the markets' reaction.
The research surveyed here provides significant, preliminary evidence
with regard to the value of the board of directors as a whole, and of outside
directors in particular both as monitors and as providers of guidance. This study
adds to this line of research in examining the wealth effects of significant changes
to the board of directors, both in terms of the boards composition and in terms of
the directors' legal liability.
2.2 The Importanceof D irectorLiability
Managerial misconduct is, to some extent, deterred by the markets for
managerial services and directorships. There is some recent evidence on the
efficiency of the market for directorships as a disciplining force. Directors who
depart from boards of distressed firms hold approximately one third fewer
directorships three years after they depart the ailing firm [Gilson (1990)]. Kaplan
and Reishus (1990) using dividend cuts to measure performance examine the
relation between a firm's performance and the top executives' service on other
boards. They find that top executives of companies reducing dividends are
approximately 50% less likely to receive outside directorships than are top
15
executives of companies that do not reduce dividends. Nevertheless, it is unlikely
that the market for directors is completely efficient. Williamson (1985) identifies
three conditions that must be met for reputation effects to be effective agency
cost-containment devices. First, managerial opportunistic behavior must be
publicly observable. Second, the deleterious effects of opportunism must be
ascertained. Finally, the offenders must be penalized with a complete ex-post
settling up. These conditions are not easily met and, thus, stockholders must be
accorded other avenues for redress. They can either remove the directors and
possibly the managers themselves, or sue the directors or managers for inadequate
performance.
Stockholders' ability to remove managers and directors is, however,
severely limited. This mechanism requires a costly and uncertain proxy fight and
the odds of winning are generally slim. Small investors lack the resources or
knowledge required to win such a contest, while larger investors might find the
option of a tender offer for the firm more attractive. These factors magnify the
importance of shareholders' right to sue managers and directors for
mismanagement. This option is available to both small and large investors
(especially if lawyers work on a contingent-fee basis). Thus, managers and
directors are held personally liable for the actions they take, or do not take, as part
of their responsibilities to the firm. Shareholders can recover any losses they may
have sustained as a result of the firm's mismanagement. Directors and managers
that are sued suffer from potential monetary losses and legal costs. They are
forced to expend large amounts of time away from their main business and suffer
the consequences of such a suit in the market for their services. Thus, the
16
potential of a law suit can be a powerful tool in realigning managers' and
directors' incentives with those of shareholders.
Romano (1991) examines the effects of legal action brought against
directors on the internal governance of the firm. He finds that firms whose boards
are sued experience a higher turnover of the CEO and Chairman than do other
similar firms. In addition, these boards tend to experience greater turnover of
directors with the general tendency being an increase in the proportion of outside
directors on the post law suit board. This evidence would suggest that internal
monitoring goes on as a result of a lawsuit: that board members and management
are held accountable for lawsuits. Thus Romano's results support the view that
the ability of shareholders to sue directors functions as an alternative method of
disciplining directors, thus better aligning them with shareholders.
The dramatic increase in lawsuits brought against management and
directors in the 1980 s (discussed subsequently), attests to the popularity of this
method of disciplining managerial misconduct.
2.3 THE D&O LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS - HISTORY
Historically, the legal option of suing managers and directors was limited
to cases were shareholders could prove that these agents had acted at least in gross
negligence while managing the firm. Proving gross negligence, however, is
extremely difficult. The "business judgment rule" was adopted by the courts
allowing directors to base their defense on the fact that their decisions were made
with good intent, and that faulty decisions resulted from honest mistakes. Courts
did not attempt to second-guess directors and officers and they did not seek to
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assess whether decisions made by these agents were correct. As one court put it,
"In the absence of a showing of bad faith on the part of the directors or of a gross
abuse of discretion, the business judgment of the directors will not be interfered
with by the courts...The acts of directors are presumably acts taken in good faith
and inspired for the best interests of the corporation, and a minority stockholder
who challenges theirbona fides of purpose has the burden of proof" [Warshaw v.
Calhoun, 221 A. 2d 487 (1966)].
The courts limited themselves to determining whether the directors'
decisions were made in good faith and with the best interest of shareholders in
mind. Proving that directors did not act in good faith or that their decisions
constituted willful misconduct thus proved very difficult, explaining why
shareholder suits were rare. Thus, until the decade of the 1980s, directors had
wide immunity from liability suits, and wide latitude in performing theirduties as
shareholders' agents.
The situation has changed dramatically in recent years as courts have
expanded the meaning of gross negligence to go beyond the business judgment
rule. This trend culminated in the case of Smith Vs. Van Gorkom. [4BB A. 2d 858
(Del 1985)] The court found the board of directors grossly negligent in that the
directors had failed to fully inform themselves of "all material information
reasonably available to them".
Whereas in the past courts had only considered directors and officers
liable for "acts of commission", this case extended their liability to "acts of
omission". Shareholders could now sue directors and officers for acts they did not
take, but should have. In this case, the Supreme court of Delaware found the
18
directors and officers liable for monetary damages, because the board had
negotiated a merger without considering all relevant information and without
lengthy deliberation. This decision was made even though the merger price was
fifty percent above the firm's market price. The director-defendants settled the
case for $23.5 million of which only $lO million was covered by D&O liability
insurance.
The celebrated Van Gorkom case and other similar cases opened up a
Pandora's Box. The period following Van Gorkom saw a deluge in the number of
claims against directors and officers. Figure 1 shows the increase in the number
of claims filled against a sample of firms surveyed in the Wyatt Directors and
Officers Liability Survey - 1988. The number of D&O liability claims rose at an
average rate of 25% a year between 1979 and 1987. At the same time the average
total cost of a claim more than doubled to $3,048,000. In addition, Korn/Ferry
International's Annual (1986) Confidential Survey of Board Practices (survey of
the nation's 1000 largest corporations) showed that 16% of the responding
companies said that the board of directors had been sued within the last three
years [Lewin (1987)].
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Figure 1: Number of Claims Filed by Year Made (1979-1987).
(Data from the Wyatt Directors and Officers Liability Survey - 1988)
Director liability, while it deters acts of negligence, also has a potential
negative effect. Directors cognizant of the risk to their personal wealth, if they
agree to serve as directors at all, become cautious in their decision-making. An
over-defensive, risk-averse director is not in shareholders' best interest. To
partially protect directors from the consequences of being sued firms typically
purchase D&O liability insurance for them. While D&O liability insurance
reduces the monetary threat it does not totally eliminate it because most D&O
liability insurance policies include a deductible, payable by the director. In
addition, the director still suffers from the other consequences of being sued, such
as loss of time and reputation. In the Wyatt survey 73% of all firms, and 92% of
publicly traded corporations, purchased D&O liability insurance.
Prior to 1984 D&O insurance was widely available at reasonable rates,
limits and deductibles. However, since then, the rates and the level of deductibles
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required increased dramatically, while the limits decreased. For example,
according to Cottingham (1988), whereas in 1984 a D&O policy with some sl6
million of coverage cost approximately $19,000, with a total deductible of
$44,000, the same policy in 1987 would have cost $243,000, with a deductible of
$295,000. Thus, after Van Gorkom, D&O liability insurance premiums increased
as much as 1000%, with the cost to Fortune 1000 companies rising on average
506% from 1985-1986 [Shaw (1989)]. Figure 2 illustrates the dramatic rise in
D&O liability insurance premiums.
Figure 2: Wyatt D&O Premium Index (1974-1988).
(Data from the Wyatt Directors and Officers Liability Survey - 1988. The index accounts
for additional variables such as corporate size, policy limits, and deductibles, in
calculating the premium index. Rates for 1974 are used as the base of 1.0.
This steep rise in premiums resulted from the steep increase in lawsuits
and losses as well as increase in the legal uncertainty following the Van Gorkom
case. This made it impossible for many firms to purchase D&O liability
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insurance. Many insurance companies either refused to insure firms or
dramatically increased the premiums and deductibles while increasing the number
of exclusions so that they provided little coverage, thus making these policies very
unattractive to many firms [Doyle (1991)].
The dramatic rise in the level of lawsuit settlements coupled with the
firms' inability to provide them insurance led directors, not surprisingly, to resign
their posts and refuse to serve as directors. Continental Steel, for example, lost 8
of 12 directors between 1985 and 1988 (see chapter 4 for more details on director
resignations during this period). The personal financial risk directors faced had
exceeded the financial and other benefits associated with serving on the board.
These resignations, however, were only the tip of the crisis iceberg. The
real problem was that even firms with insurance had difficulty attracting directors.
This problem was widespread, in small and large companies alike, and across
different industries. Many companies took drastic action to respond to this
problem. As an example of the desperate measures corporations have taken in
order to hold on to their directors is this quote from Business Week (July 3,
1989):
"Troubled Southmark Corp. wanted so to hold on to two directors that it
paid them a onetime, $300,000 bonus for services rendered. To entice new
directors, it offers a $50,000 ",sign on" bonus and $50,000 in pay." A cover story
in Business Week (September 8, 1986) dramatized the crisis as did a Wall Street
Journal article from February 5, 1986 titled "Hot Seats: Board Members Draw
Fire and Some Think Twice About Serving", by A. Bennett. A recent corporate
finance textbook [Rao (1992), chapter 21 on Corporate Governance] addresses the
problems faced by firms in attracting outside directors. Anecdotal evidence of
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these problems is extensive and a few excerpts are illustrative of the widespread
concern:
"I'm afraid we're going back to having more inside
directors because outsiders are afraid to serve" [John Nash,
president of the National Association of Corporate Directors,
quoted in R. Behar and M. Clifford, "Kibitzing from the
Boardroom", Forbes, February 10, 1986].
"There's an air ofdesperation...Directors are resigning and
refusing to serve on boards" (L. Parks, assistant to the president,
Contran Corporation, quoted in "Risky businesses: Corporate
Directors Bail Out", ABA Journal, June 1, 1986).
"One result of the increases in liability is that
" it's very ,
very difficult to get someone with experience" to sit on boards of
directors" [Marshall Manley, of a law firm in California and
president of Home Group, which owns Home Insurance Co.,
quoted in "Corporate Boardroom Woes Grow", The National Law
Journal, August 4, 1986].
"More and more, outside directors are an endangered
species. The people the boards want don't want to serve on any
more boards. And it appears that, when there is a vacancy, if the
company can't get the person it wants, it may leave the seat
unfilled" [Business and the Law, Tamar Lewin, New York Times,
Jan 13, 1987].
"As insurance becomes less and less available on
reasonable terms, qualified outside directors in increasing
numbers are refusing to serve without adequate insulation from
personal liability" [The Business Lawyer, Update, July/Aug
1986].
"Some companies, especially in troubled industries such as
banking and oil and gas, have lost outside directors who were
unwilling to expose their personal fortunes to shareholder suits
"
["Companies ask Holders to Limit Board Liability", Cynthia
Crossen, Wall Street Journal. 10/7/86].
"Concerned about increasing legal hassles and time
demands, scores of directors are quietly stepping down. Some
prominent executives confide that when their terms expire, they
will not standfor reelection to outside boards" ['The Job Nobody
Wants", Business Week, Sept 8, 1986].
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The direct evidence from surveys is even more illustrative. A 1986 survey
of 596 CEOs by the CEO/Peat Marwick Panel on D&O Liability ["Directors' and
Officers' Liability: A Crisis in the Making", 1987, Peat Marwick Main & Co.]
indicates that 95% of the CEOs believe that there is an incipient crisis; 43%
believed that the situation had already reached crisis proportions. The survey also
reports that of the 709 responses received from a poll of 2,765 bank presidents,
91%, a strong consensus, believed that there was a D &O crisis in the making.
Only 6% said that the issue was overblown and that there was no crisis. Even
stronger evidence is contained in Korn /Ferry International's 1986 Report which
begins: "This has been a very difficult year for directors. Based on the results of
our Thirteenth Annual Board ofDirectors Study, we think that corporations are
going to find it much harder to attract and retain qualified directors than they do
today." 60% of the companies in this national survey believed that recent court
decisions inhibited the company's ability to attract new directors; 34% said recent
court decisions would hurt them in retaining existing directors; 61% believed that
the (then) current emphasis on director liability was not a temporary phenomenon;
96% of CEOs said they would limit the number of directorships they will hold
because of the increased liability; 52% of companies reported that the sharp rise
in D&O liability premiums will make it more difficult to recruit high-level
outside directors.
Finally, companies reported that one out of five qualified candidates
turned down an invitation to serve on the board. Korn/Ferry's Fourteenth Annual
Study (1987) (a survey of 1000 companies which included the Fortune 500,
Fortune 100 major service companies, Fortune 50 major banking institutions, 50
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major insurance companies, 50 major diversified financial companies, 50 major
retailers, 50 major transportation companies, and 150 selected smaller companies;
71.3% of NYSE companies) points out that while no prospective director offered
increasing legal liability as a reason for declining an invitation to serve on a board
in 1982, the number rose to 2.5% in 1985 and to 14.2% in 1986. Moreover, 71%
of Chairmen surveyed believed that they had problems in attracting outside
directors. As a consequence, many firms downsized their boards because of
difficulties in finding outside directors (see "A Good Director is getting Harder to
Find," Wall Street Journal. February 9, 1988).
If directors, especially outside directors, are important in protecting
shareholders' interests in the day-to-day management of the firm it is in
shareholders' best interest to find a balance between their rights to hold directors
liable for their actions on the one hand and the need for attracting qualified
directors on the other. This balance can allow directors to fully utilize their
expertise and entrepreneurial skills, allowing them to take on risks when and if
necessary, while at the same time providing them with the right incentives to
work in the shareholders' best interests.
2.4 RESEARCH POTENTIAL
While there is much anecdotal evidence that a directors liability crisis
occurred, there is not scientific or empirical validation of this crisis. This
dissertation provides a more rigorous, empirical analysis of whether such a crisis
did indeed occur. An answer to this question could shed light on several other
interesting issues: If a crisis did occur then what is the effect of changes in
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liability rules on firm behavior and firm value? Was the political response, and the
governance changes that resulted, positive or negative to firm value? Did all
firms respond in the same way or did some firms suffer or benefit more from the
crisis than others?
If a crisis did indeed occur and directors were resigning on the one hand
and difficult to replace on the other, then this period presents a unique opportunity
to evaluate the value of outside directors' more directly than previously done. In
addition, the elimination of directors liability that was introduced in order to
combat the alleged crisis also presents an interesting event that can be analyzed in
terms of the value placed by shareholders on outside directors. These issues will
be pursued in chapters 4 and 5.
Chapter 3: Directors Role in Financial Distress and the Liability
Crisis
3.1 The Role of Directors in PoorlyPerforming Firms
As the discussion in Chapter 2 suggests, theoretical arguments have been
made on both sides of the debate regarding the effectiveness of the board of
directors. Empirical evidence does however suggest, that in times of major
decision making (takeover, merger, poison pill) shareholders are more confident
in the firm's actions when outsiders have a significant presence on the board of
directors [Brickley, Coles & Terry (1993) and Byrd & Hickman (1992)]. This
might suggest that the board, and primarily its outside members are especially
valuable during events of strategic importance. Poor financial performance, that
increases the probability of financial distress and possibly bankruptcy should,
therefore, also be a time where outside directors play an important role.
Evidence that directors behave differently in times of crisis is contained in
the Lorsch & Maclver study, perhaps the most comprehensive analysis of
corporate governance to date. These authors interviewed nearly 100 outside
directors over a three year period and received questionnaires from over 2000. A
key finding is that whereas directors generally play a passive role deferring to the
decisions of the CEO, they become actively involved in decision-making when
the firm is in a crisis. The generally inactive board is transformed into a proactive
body when the firm is in some form of distress. For example, directors are more
likely to confront the CEO at board meetings on matters relating to poor financial
performance data, problems with debt service and difficulties in refinancing. To
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dramatize this finding Lorsch-Maclver quote a director:
"Directors are like
firemen. They sit around doing very little until there is a fire alarm and then they
spring into action. "
The evidence from Lorsch and Maclver, combined with the evidence
reviewed in Chapter 2, suggests that in firms approaching financial distress
directors become more active and more valuable to shareholders. Of course, one
could legitimately claim that shareholders will not trust the directors that allowed
the firm to reach financial distress. Indeed, Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) find
that in firms performing poorly inside directors are replaced by new outside
directors. Thus, new specialists are recruited to help the firm get out of its
troubles. Chapter 4 analyses the markets response to changes in board
composition for healthy and financially distressed firms.
Because of the position a firm is in when it approaches financial distress,
and because of the legal constraints it will face in bankruptcy, outside directors
may play a "strategic role" in poorly performing firms, a role that adds to the
traditional view that outside directors perform guidance and monitoring
functions.
If outside directors in a poorly performing firm resign, the firm may lose
its right to elect new directors if it becomes insolvent; the court can appoint its
own choices [as in re Johns-Mansville Corp., 801 F 2nd. 60, 65 n. 6 (2nd Circuit
1986). See Davis et. al. (1991) for other examples]. A distressed (pre-bankruptcy)
firm has incentives to avoid this possibility. In addition, outside directors on
boards of distressed companies may make it easier for these companies to sell the
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firm or privately refinance it, thereby avoiding the costs associated with
bankruptcy.
Because of exchange rules, audit committees are made up solely of outside
directors for all NYSE and most other exchange firms. In addition, some stock
exchange self-regulatory organizations envision a special role for audit
committees in financial distress situations. One example of this increased role is
in the context of selling control of the company without shareholder vote. Under
the Revlon case [Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., Del.
1986] directors must have enough information to conclude that a transaction is in
the best interests of the stockholders considering the other options available.
However, for a financially distressed firm, an immediate cash infusion may be
crucial for survival and there may be no time to obtain a stockholders' vote. For
example, a potential acquirer offers to provide the necessary liquidity in return
for a majority of the company's voting stock if the deal will be consummated
within a few days. In this situation, the audit committee may appeal to the NYSE
for an exception to the rule and go ahead without a stockholder vote. Thus, the
outside directors on the audit committee may be able to "save" a company in deep
financial distress. It would be interesting to examine whether this added flexibility
has any role in explaining why low Tobin's q firms are more often the targets of
takeovers.
In addition, it may be advantageous for a firm in distress to have outside
directors with minimal ownership in the firm make decisions regarding
employment terminations. Delikat (1991) points to the increasing trend that
individuals making discrimination claims "personalize" their claims by joining
29
directors with employers. By making a director a target for a potential lawsuit the
claimant can avoid the possibility that all litigation will be stayed because the firm
subsequently files for bankruptcy protection. In a related labor matter, the court
[in Trustees of the Amalgamated Insurance Fund v. Danin] found that personal
liability should be imposed on directors with significant ownership interest.
Outside directors without substantial interest in the financially distressed company
may thus be better off making these potentially litigious decisions that are likely
to arise with greater frequency in poorly performing firms.
These examples suggest that outside directors may play a vital “strategic”
role in poorly performing firms.
3.1 THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIRECTOR LIABILITY CRISIS ON
DIRECTORS OF FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED FIRMS
Because of their increased role in managing the firm, and their increased
exposure to value changing decisions, the potential legal liability of directors
increases as the firm approaches financial distress. Firms which are doing poorly
are more likely to be sued, and to lose the law suit since shareholders have proof
of their losses. Thus, the cost of serving on a corporate board increases as the
probability of financial distress increases.
In addition, directors' roles and responsibilities change when the firm is in
distress, in ways that are not yet fully understood. There is a growing awareness
that financial distress poses special challenges to managers and directors.
Normally, firms operate under the general principles of corporate law of the
relevant state. However, portions of state law are superseded by Federal
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bankruptcy laws and even many state laws have provisions to accommodate
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
Because insolvency alters the rules and regulations governing board
decisions, traditional governance principles do not necessarily apply.
Traditionally the courts have held that the directors' responsibility are to the
stockholders. Even in states that have adopted broader "constituency laws", courts
have maintained that a board of directors "may have regard to other
constituencies" but only if there are "rationally related benefits to shareholders".
However, in distress, directors may owe fiduciary duties to creditors as well as,
and sometimes, instead of, to stockholders. In Clarkson Co. Ltd. vs Shaheen [660
F. 2d. at 512] the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that directors'
duties to creditors arose once the company was "insolvent." This "duty-reversal"
in complicated by the fact that because the courts have not defined "insolvency"
precisely [Brown (1991), Varallo and Finkelstein (1992) and Coffee (1992)]
directors may not know exactly when their duty shifts away from stockholders
and on to creditors [Davis et.al. (1991)].
Although several issues regarding the nature of directors' fiduciary duties
still remain unclear, Brown (1991) points out that most of the cases in which
directors owe fiduciary duties to creditors either involve companies that have
since failed or are hopelessly insolvent or involve allegations of self-dealing by
the directors. To the extent that outside directors can reduce these problems, they
may serve to retain the status quo
of the firm's extant governance structure by
obviating directors' potential responsibilities to constituencies other than the
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stockholders. In any case these court rulings allow creditors greater opportunity
to impose personal liability upon directors.
Possibly even more troubling for directors is the fact that if a company
indemnifies them and the firm then files bankruptcy, a their indemnification claim
against the firm may be treated exactly as that of an unsecured creditor's claim.
The increased personal risk from corporate decision-making coupled with
the increased ambiguity in directors' duties in poorly performing firms, combined
with the increased liability associated with the litigation of the mid-1980s
(Chapter 2) had the potential to paralyze the board and hurt the firm just as the
board was needed most. With their changing roles and responsibilities taking no
action whatsoever was a safer course of action for directors; inaction minimized
the threat of personal liability. It is harder to prove that inaction caused harm than
to prove that a specific action did.
Thus, the liability crisis had the potential of harming poorly performing
firms more than other firms in that it brought a paralysis to boards' of firms that
could least afford it. Therefore, these firms would be the ones most likely to
benefit from the elimination of the crisis and the protection of directors. For firms
in financial distress eliminating the directors' increased liability would demobilize
the directors into action, improve the dynamics of the board (e.g., foster greater
participation and active monitoring) and thereby benefit the firm. In firms that are
doing well and that are not facing a crisis situation, theory would suggest that
directors are less actively involved in the managing and monitoring of the firm.
Therefore one would expect that they where less effected by the liability crisis
that where financially distressed firms. Chapter 5 presents an empirical test of
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this idea by examining the markets reaction to the elimination of director liability
(that, at least at the time, was viewed as bringing an end to the crisis) for both
poorly performing and healthy firms.
Chapter 4: Director Resignations - Evidence for The Directors
Liability Crisis
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapters, extensive casual evidence exists as
to the occurrence of a director liability crisis between 1984 and 1987. However,
no direct empirical evidence documents the existence of a crisis. In this chapter
evidence regarding the market reaction to directors' resignation before and after
the supposed crisis will be analyzed. Hypotheses are presented as to the expected
effect of a crisis on shareholders response to these resignations. It is thus hoped
that evidence will be uncovered as to the validity of the "crisis" idea.
In addition to issues relating to the question of the liability crisis, this
study addresses the question of whether changes in the composition of the board
of directors have any effect of the value of the firm. Because of the perceived
dramatic nature of the directors and officers liability crisis and the changes in
corporate governance that resulted from it, the period between 1984 and 1987 is
especially apt to studies on the effect of changes in the board of directors.
The question of whether the resignation of directors impacts firm value
has not been addressed in the literature. This study investigates this issue during
the liability crisis and following it. Thus, questions regarding the relevant
importance of directors in general and outside directors in particular are
addressed.
Evidence to suggest that there is a significant difference in shareholders'
response to directors' resignations during and after the crisis is presented. During
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the crisis, shareholders view director resignations as a significantly negative
event, while in the period after the crisis these resignations do not negatively
impact shareholders wealth. These results provide evidence consistent with the
idea that a directors crisis did indeed occur. In addition, evidence is presented that
suggests that outside directors are especially valuable to poorly performing firms,
and that when they cannot be replaced, their resignation is viewed as significantly
negative by shareholders. These results are confirmed while controlling for a
variety of firm specific characteristics.
Section 4.2 discusses the significance of the event studied: the resignation
of directors. Section 4.3 develops the hypotheses regarding shareholders response
to these resignations. The data collection method, descriptive statistics and
methodology are discussed in section 4.4. Results for the various tests are
presented in section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes the discussion with a summary
and closing remarks.
4.2 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DIRECTOR RESIGNATIONS
Much research has been devoted to the valuation effects of the
resignations of CEOs and other managers. On the other hand the resignation of a
member of the board of directors, if he is not the CEO, President, or Chairman,
very rarely gets publicized. Thus, little if any research has been devoted to the
measurement of possible valuation effects that result from the resignations of
directors. Part of the reason for this neglect is the view that directors, as
individuals, play an insignificant role in the functioning of the corporation; that
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they are puppets in the hands of a strong CEO. For this reason, changes in board
composition are probably considered to have no or negligible economic effects.
It is also true that changes in board composition can occur frequently as
directors retire, change jobs, or with changes in ownership or management of the
firm. One would not expect these normal changes in the board to have significant
valuation effects - directors can be easily and relatively costlessly replaced.
An additional possible reason for the little attention resignations of
directors have received in the finance literature is the fact that even for
resignations of CEOs few conclusive empirical results have been arrived at.
Depending on the circumstances surrounding a CEO's resignation, shareholders
response has been documented to be significantly positive in financially distressed
firms [Bonnier and Bruner (1989)], and in firms where managers are dismissed
[Furtado and Rozeff (1987)]. Alternatively, for large samples, researchers have
found insignificant shareholder response [Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988),
Weisbach (1988), Reinganum (1985)]. And in one case [Sant (1988)], a
significant negative response has been documented. Thus, even for a major
resignation event, such as the resignation of a CEO, the results are hard to
explain.
As Jensen and Warner (1988) note, there are two effects captured by
abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of management changes; an
information effect and a real effect. If the resignations convey to the market that
the firm is doing worse than expected, one would expect a negative response as a
result of this information effect. On the other hand, the real effect could be
positive if the changes in management are in shareholders' best interest. If the
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firm is doing poorly one would expect shareholders to view managerial turnover
as positive, i.e., replace the managers that created the firm's problems with new
ones who might be able to solve them.
These effects should, to some extent, exist when directors resign from the
board. However, when a single director resigns, one would expect both these
effects to be negligible. In this study, the announced resignations of at least two
directors are examined because such an announcement has imbedded in it a more
significant informational and real effect. The expectation is that under normal
circumstances shareholders will respond to meaningful director resignations
approximately the same as they would to the resignation of a CEO. If the firm is
performing poorly, directors share the responsibility for the performance with the
managers. Thus, in such firms shareholders would view the replacement of
directors as positive, as long as new qualified directors could be found as
replacements. On the other hand, the resignations could convey to shareholders
negative information regarding the firm and thus causing shareholders to react
negatively to the announcement.
In order to control for the information effect Bonnier and Bruner (1989)
study poorly performing firms with the assumption that the negative information
regarding these firms is already incorporated in prices so that a CEO's resignation
will not convey any significant additional information. They thus find positive
returns associated with the CEO resignation. In this chapter, director resignations
are studied in a similar way; firm performance is controlled for in determining
shareholders' response to the resignations. The purpose is to capture the real
effect of these resignations.
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Directors resign from boards for a variety of reasons; personal,
disagreement with other directors or management, changes in ownership or
management, restructuring of the board, and others. During the liability crisis,
another motivation for directors to resign was introduced - the fear of legal
liability.
The uniqueness of the liability crisis period is in the fact that there is
reason to believe that during this period corporations had difficulties attracting
new directors to their boards. Thus, a directors resignation, even for trivial
reasons, could have a lasting effect on the composition of the board.
These circumstances allow for an analysis of the value of the outside
directors on the board. If a outside director cannot be replaced easily, then the
resignation of a director has additional significance. Shareholders are valuing the
net loss of a director, not his replacement. Thus, the real effect would not be the
effect of replacement but the effect of the possibility that the firm will have to do
without an outside replacement. As a result, shareholders reaction, assuming they
value the presence of outside directors on their board, will be negative, where it
might, under normal circumstances, be positive.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the role of directors changes when firms are
financially distressed. In normal times one would expect shareholders of poorly
performing firms to favor replacing the board of directors who brought the
company to its weak financial position. However, when new qualified directors
are hard to find the question becomes; are these directors better than no directors
or unqualified directors.
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Firms that are poor performers are more likely to be sued and more likely
to lose their lawsuits. Thus, directors of poorly performing are more likely to
leave the board in order to escape the possible consequences of legal action. One
would expect this to be especially true during the liability crisis when directors
found themselves with weakening legal and insurance protection and a large
increase in the number law suits. However, as discussed in Chapter 3 the roles
and responsibilities of directors in poorly performing firms are significantly
changed and expanded as the firm approaches financial distress. Thus, this is an
especially bad time for these firms to be without qualified directors. Under
normal conditions, where directors are reasonably protected from lawsuits,
qualified individuals might view joining a distressed firm's board as a professional
challenge. Thus, under such conditions replacing directors in such firms would be
a normal event with no negative impact on the firm. However, during the director
liability crisis, it is possible that the incentive of a challenge was outweighed by
the potential expense of a lawsuit, thus reducing the supply of qualified directors
who would agree to serve on the boards of poorly performing firms. This left
firms with limited access to outside directors. Since outside directors seem to
play an important role in such firms, the inability to replace the resigning directors
could have a negative impact on the firms ability to function in shareholders best
interests as it approaches distress.
This discussion leads to testable hypotheses that are discussed in the next
section.
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4.3 Hypotheses
As discussed above, if a liability crisis did occur, we would expect the
availability of directors to be curtailed. Under such circumstances, when directors
resign, shareholders cannot assume that they can be replaced easily. This is
especially true if the directors resign from firms that lose their D&O liability
insurance, thus leaving any new directors that might join the board, unprotected.
If having a board of directors with outsiders as members is of value, then one
would expect that shareholders would respond negatively to the announced
resignation of directors. On the other hand, if the liability crisis did not occur, or
if it did not manifest itself in a shortage of qualified directors, then it is ambiguous
what, in aggregate, shareholder's response should be. If there is informational
content in the resignation, then shareholders might respond negatively.
Alternatively, if directors are being replaced for various non information reasons
there can be either no response or a positive response. Thus, if only a sample of
resignations that occur during the crisis is studied, we cannot separate between the
effect of the resignation and the effect the crisis had on shareholders response to
the resignations.
By using a sample of resignations that occurred after the liability crisis, the
effect of the crisis itself can be isolated. If there is no difference in the response
of shareholders during and after the crisis years, then it is likely that the "crisis" as
reported in the popular press did not occur. However, if a difference in response
is found to exist, it can be interpreted in terms of the crisis. The fact that two
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periods, that are potentially different in terms of the protection offered directors,
can be analyzed enriches the results and their interpretation.
If a crisis did indeed exist, and if directors are valuable, a negative
shareholder response to directors' resignations would be expected across all firms.
This response should be especially acute among poorly performing firms who
have a greater need for qualified directors and for whom the crisis made it more
difficult to attract these individuals. The effect of the crisis on poorly performing
firms would probably dominate any real effects suggested by Jensen and Warner
(1988) since the real effect assumes that incompetent directors can be replaced by
more qualified personnel. However, if the crisis indeed occurred then this
replacement would not be obviously possible. The liability crisis, by increasing
the costs associated with serving on the board of a poorly performing firm,
reduced the available pool of qualified directors to the point where many firms
could not replace their directors without incurring significant costs. Thus, poorly
performing firms should have suffered more as a result of the crisis than did firms
who were doing well and could probably find new directors to replace those who
had resigned.
It is difficult to construct a viable hypothesis regarding the average
shareholders' response to the resignations of directors during the non crisis years.
For this period the information and real effects work in opposite directions so that
with the aggregate data a prediction for the overall reaction cannot be made.
However, by controlling for firm performance, thus reducing the impact of the
informational effect [see Bonnier and Bruner (1989)], the real effect becomes
more evident. For poor performing firms the informational effect is of little
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significance because the market already knows that the firm is doing poorly.
Thus, shareholders reaction to directors resignations in such firms should be
evidence of the real effect of these resignations. If in the post crisis years the
resigning directors can be easily replaced, then one would expect shareholders in
poorly performing firms to react positively to changes in the board's composition.
The directors that brought the firm to its poor condition are being replaced.
For firms that are doing well, in non crisis years, the resignation of
directors could have informational content regarding those directors assessment of
future firm performance. For these firms the informational effect might convey
bad information and is difficult to separate from the real effect that might have a
positive valuation effect. Thus, for healthy firms in non crisis years one would
expect a less positive response than for poorly performing firms of that same
period.
If the crisis did indeed occur then one would expect the following
predictions to come true:
1. During the crisis years shareholders will, on average, respond negatively to
directors' resignations, while in non crisis years the average response,
while difficult to predict, is expected to be non-negative.
2. During the crisis shareholders will react more negatively to the directors'
resignations from poorly performing firms than from other firms.
3. After the crisis shareholders in poorly performing firms will react more
positively to directors' resignations than shareholders of other firms.
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4.4 DATA & METHODOLOGY
4.4.1 Identification of Firms
Directors regularly depart from boards for various reasons, many of them
personal. In an attempt to find those firms where the resignation of directors
conveyed meaningful information, the sample is limited to firms where at least
two directors resigned. Thus, to be included in the sample, the resignation of two
or more directors from a firm must have been announced at the same time
In order to capture the effect of the departure of outside directors, of the
two resigning directors at least one had to be an outsider. To identify firms with
such occurrences, a text search was conducted on various databases available
through the Lexis/Nexis database. If it was unclear from the news announcement
if a director was an outside director, proxy statements were consulted. The search
was limited to the period of 1984 to 1990. 109 firms were identified.
The announcements of directors' resignations were found in several
sources, primarily over the business wire services. These news services, as well
as the major newspapers were scanned for possibly related news events
surrounding the resignations.
In order to perform the analysis required, return data as well as
performance data was required for each firm. For 10 of the firms no return data
was available from CRSP for the dates surrounding the resignations. For 13 firms
no performance data from COMPUSTAT was available for the years preceding
the resignations. Thus, the final sample includes 86 firms.
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4.4.2 Time Frame
The sample was constructed in order to include the period of the crisis and
the period following it. As discussed above, the period of the liability crisis is
believed to have begun during 1984 and continued into 1987. During 1987 the
crisis was mitigated somewhat by the introduction of various state laws limiting
director liability. These laws will be discussed in detail in chapter 5. To capture
resignations of directors during and after the crisis, the sample includes firms in
which directors resigned during the period from 1984 to 1990.
In order to test shareholders' reaction to director resignations during and
after the liability crisis period, firms are examined in these two periods. For the
purpose of analysis, the sample is divided into two primary portfolios: one
including all resignations that occurred during the 1984 to 1986 period, and the
other including all the resignations that occurred during the 1988 to 1990 period.
The 1984-1986 and 1988-1990 portfolios include 41 and 37 firms respectively.
The sample from 1987 is dropped in most of the portfolio comparisons because it
is somewhat ambiguous whether this period can still be considered part of the
crisis years or not. It is likely that this depends on the firm's state of incorporation
since different states enacted amendments eliminating director liability at different
times. In addition, investors' expectations during 1987, regarding the availability
of directors, could have been influenced by the increased legislative activity that
was aimed at mitigating the problem. For this reason, resignations that occurred
in 1987 are not included in most of the portfolio comparisons, but are included in
the cross sectional regressions.
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4.4.3 Descriptive Statistics of Sample
4.4.3.1 Resignations and Board Composition
Resignations of at least two directors, one of which is an outsider, are
identified for the purpose of this study. In addition, information about the
appointment of directors within a three day window of the resignations is also
tracked. A three day window was chosen because after this time frame
information regarding many of these companies becomes very scarce. The focus
here is on the ability or importance of replacing these directors immediately.
Panel A in Table 4.1 presents a breakdown of the number of resignations
and appointments for the total sample; the average number of resignations is 3.4
and of appointments 1.3.
Panel Bin Table 4.1 presents the number of resignations and appointments
by year. During the period of the liability crisis (1984-1986) there are a larger
number of resignations and a smaller number of immediate appointments than in
the period following the crisis. On average, during 1984-1986 period 3.8
directors resigned and 1.1 were appointed as compared to 3.081 and 1.6
respectively for the 1988-1990 period. Panel C in Table 4.1 documents the
statistical difference in these values between the two periods. The number of
resignations in the crisis years is only marginally significantly different than those
in the post crisis period. However, the difference between the number of directors
resigning and being appointed is significantly larger for the 1984-1986 sample
than for the 1988-1990 period. In addition, the ratio of directors appointed to
resigning is significantly smaller for the crisis years. Statistical significance is
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determined using a standard t-Test, a Mann-Whitney sign test an a Kolmogorov-
Smimoff non parametric test.
The significant difference in the net change in directors (resignations
minus appointments) provides preliminary evidence with regard to the liability
crisis. If directors were difficult to recruit, or if there was uncertainty regarding
the availability of directors, it would be less likely that directors could be replaced
immediately after the announced resignation. Thus, the fact that during the crisis
years firms did not replace directors as quickly as they did in the years following
the crisis is evidence in support of the idea that a crisis did indeed occur.
The impact of directors' resignations could be influenced by the
composition of the board from which they are resigning. Panel A in Table 4.2
presents statistics regarding the average board composition before the resignations
and information regarding the percentage of outside directors that resigned.
Average board size for the total sample is 8.8 with 57.7% of these directors being
outside directors. Of the outside directors on the board, on average, 63%
resigned.
Panel B in Table 4.2 presents statistics regarding the average board
composition before the resignations and the percentage of outside directors that
resigned for each of the sample years. The statistics for outside directors on the
board and those resigning look very similar for both the crisis and the post crisis
periods. Indeed, Panel C provides evidence that there is no significant difference
between the two samples except for the fact that the size of the boards of directors
during the crisis appears to be larger (marginally statistically significant) than the
boards of firms after the crisis. The larger board could be associated with the fact
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that firms in the 1984 to 1986 sample are larger than those in the 1988-1990
sample (see section 4.4.3.2). Since the composition of the boards of directors is
very similar, whatever differences there may be in shareholders' responses to
these resignations are probably not due to differences in board composition
between the two samples.
4.4.3.2 Performance
In order to capture both the market's estimation of firm performance and
the historical performance of these firms, three measures of firm performance are
used; one market based measure and two accounting measures. As a market
measure of performance the firms market value of equity plus the book value of
long term debt and preferred stock, divided by the firm's book value of assets is
used. While this is potentially a weak proxy for Tobin's q [Perfect & Wiles
(1993)] more accurate estimates are especially difficult considering the variety of
industries in which the firms in this sample operate. This variable captures the
market's estimation of the firm's potential for rents, i.e., the ability of the firm to
use the assets it posses to generate economic rents in the future. Firms that are
poorly managed, or whose assets are not capable of generating such rents, will
have a market value to total assets ratio of less than one. These firms are believed
by the market to be poorly performing with little prospects for the future.
Alternatively, firms whose ratio is greater than one are believed to have positive
opportunities for future profits. Thus, this performance variable is a forward-
looking measure.
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Two accounting measures are used. The first, operating profits to total
assets, adjusted for industry by subtracting the mean value for the corresponding
two-digit SIC code for the firm's industry, is a measure of the firm's current
operating performance. Since a firm's performance is often evaluated in
comparison to the performance of similar firms, the industry adjustment is made
in order to control for possible industry-wide effects. The operating performance
measure is calculated for the two years preceding the resignations. The
differences in performance between the two years are also used in the regression
analysis in Section 4.5.
As an alternative specification of performance, we employ the operating
performance measure used by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990). Firms with 5
years of positive "bottom line" income and pre-tax operating income are
considered firms with high operating performance (HOP). Firms with three years
of negative net "bottom line" income or negative pre-tax operating income during
the five years preceding the proxy year are defined as firms with low operating
performance (LOP). A net "bottom line" loss occurs when Compustat Item 18
(income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations) plus Item 48
(extraordinary items and discontinued operations) is less than zero. A pre-tax
operating loss exists when Item 13 (operating income before depreciation) minus
item 14 (depreciation expense) is less than zero.
Information required to derive these performance measures and
information on the size of the firms in our sample are available from
COMPUSTAT.
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Panels A and B in Table 4.3 presents summary performance and size
statistics for the total sample and for the sub-samples divided by year. Panel C
presents a comparison of the performance and size of the firms in the two
samples: 1984-1986 and 1988-1990. The mean size of all firms in the sample, as
measured by total assets, is $639 million with a median of $9O million. Across
the different years, 1985 is the only period in which it seems that the size of firms
is significantly different than the other years. However, this is primarily a result
of a small number of very large firms since the median is similar to those for the
other periods ($101.4 million). The firms in the portfolio with resignations during
1984-1986 are significantly larger than those with resignations in the 1988-1990
period (mean difference of $542 million). Thus, resignations of more than one
director at the same time occurred in larger firms during the crisis than following
it.
The market value to total assets ratio is below 1.0 for all periods except
1987, which means that this sample is one of mostly poorly performing firms. In
addition, there is no statistically significant difference between the crisis years
sample and the sample of firms from the post crisis years. The low values for this
variable suggest that the sample is of firms with relatively weak performance. In
support of this is the fact that for all years except 1987, the ratio of operating
income to total assets, adjusted for industry, is negative. Thus, the firms in these
samples underperform their industry. The difference in operating performance
between the crisis and post crisis samples is not statistically significant.
The 1984-1986 sample has a larger number of high operating performance
firms (7) and smaller number of low operating firms (13) than does the 1988-1990
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sample (4, 19 respectively). However, these differences are not statistically
significant. Overall, prior to the resignations, the crisis and post crisis samples are
statistically similar in terms ofall the performance measures used.
4.4.4 Methodology
In order to determine shareholders' reaction to the resignation of directors,
an event study is conducted. We use the event study results for three purposes:
i) to determine the abnormal return over the total sample,
ii) to determine the abnormal returns on a number of portfolios segmented
by various variables such as year of resignation, reason for resignation and firm
performance,
iii) to produce firm-specific cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and
cumulative standardized prediction errors (CSPEs) for use in cross-sectional
regressions.
The date of the first public announcement of the directors' resignations is
used as our event date. A period of 3 days following the event-date is chosen as
the event -window and abnormal returns for this period are estimated. If no other
information is revealed to the public on the event date, then the null hypothesis is
that no abnormal market reaction will occur. Using an estimation period of 150
days prior to the event we estimate, using OLS, a market model that is specified
as:
where:
Rj t = the return on security iat date t
R-it
cq = the regression intercept
Pj = the beta coefficient (slope) of the regression
R
mt
= the return on the value-weighted CRSP index
e^t
= the error term for the regression on security iat date t
The estimates of a and |3 are used to calculate the expected return during
the event window for each firm. The difference between these calculated returns
and the actual returns for security i at date t are defined as the abnormal returns
(ARit). In equation form, these abnormal returns are:
These returns are aggregated for each firm to provide firm-specific CARs
that are later used in the cross-sectional regressions:
where T 1 and T 2 are the beginning and ending event-day in the event window.
Following Dodd and Warner [1983] these returns are standardized by the square
root of their estimated forecast variance, thus forming a standardized prediction
error, SPEjt , equal to
where
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2
s. = the estimated residual variance from the market model
i
regression for security i.
Lj = Days used for the regression.
The cumulative standardized prediction error (CSPE) for each firm
is a z-statistic, and is defined as:
To this point, returns and prediction errors are generated for use in the
cross-sectional regressions .
In order to determine the aggregate response to the event, the average
abnormal return ARj t for day t across all N firms tested is calculated:
The ARjt provides us with the average abnormal return for each day
within the event-window. The null hypothesis tested is that the ARjt's are equal
to zero, with the alternative being that they are not. If the 's are
significantly different from zero then we can state that the market has reacted to
the event, i.e., has reacted differently than we would expect had the event not
taken place. The statistical tests used in this study to determine the statistical
significance (z-statistic) of the average abnormal returns is the standardized
average abnormal return (SAR) and is denoted as
where
CSPEj = 5* , SPEiI
/JVT2-Tl+l
l
N
AR, = jq-VARit
t=l
AR t
SAR
t
=
r=1
s
t />/N
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s t =
the standard deviations of the average returns on day t
N = number of firms.
To determine the standardized cumulative abnormal return Wj for the
aggregate sample the SPEj t s are summed for each security over the event-window
thus:
where d = number of days in the event window.
To test the significance of Wj for a sample of N securities, we use
where Wj is equal to the average standardized cumulative prediction error.
Thus, the z- statistic is used to determine the probability that Wj is different
from zero, i.e., whether the cumulative effect of the event over the event-window,
is significant or not.
In addition to a pure event study, the CARs and CSPEs derived from it
will be used in both non-parametric and regression analysis to investigate the
cross sectional variation in the abnormal returns.
1
VN
1 £
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4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.2 Director Resignations - Evidence for the Liability Crisis
4.5.2.1 Event Study
The event study methodology, described in the previous section, is
conducted in order to establish shareholders' response to the resignations of
directors. In order to gain insight as to the existence of a liability crisis, in
addition to the total sample the event study is also conducted on a number of sub-
samples defined by year and by reason for the directors' resignation. Table 4.4
summarize the results for the total sample and the sub-samples.
The results for the total sample, presented in Panel A of Table 4.4, are
evidence that in the aggregate shareholders do not respond in a statistically
significant manner to the news of director resignations. Thus, for the total
sample of 86 firms the mean cumulative abnormal return on the three days
following the announcement of these resignations is 0.2% (median of -0.5%) and
not statistically significant. In addition, the number of positive CARs is almost
equal to the number of negatives.
Panel B in table 4.4 presents results for sub-samples defined by the year in
which the directors' resignation occurred. In years 1984, 1985, and 1986
cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announced resignations of directors
were negative. The CARs for 1985 and 1986 are statistically significant at the 1%
level. In addition, for portfolios of firms where directors resigned between either
1984 and 1986 or 1984 and 1987, firms lost on average 4.9% and 4% of
shareholders value respectively. These results are significant at a 1% significance
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level. Using a non-parametric sign test, CARs for 1986 and the 1984-1986
portfolios are negative with a statistical significance of 5%. Thus, resignations
during the so called liability crisis were viewed by shareholders as negative
events, which is consistent with the idea that the directors' crisis did indeed occur,
resulting in an increase in the value of the existing board of directors.
Consistent with the hypothesis presented in section 4.3, resignations that
occurred in years following the liability crisis had either no effect or a positive
effect on shareholder wealth. During 1989 and 1990, resignations of directors
brought about a significant positive return. In addition, the CARs for 1988
through 1990 are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. However,
when 1989 is excluded from this analysis, CARs while positive are not
statistically significant. In both cases, the non-parametric sign test provides no
significant evidence that there is a positive market response. No hypothesis has
been presented with regard to possible reasons for the strong positive response in
1989. However, the non-negative response to director resignations following the
resolution of the directors liability crisis during 1987, is consistent with the view
that under normal conditions the resignation of directors, in aggregate has no
significant negative effect on firm value. In normal times, these directors can be
replaced, and while their resignations can convey new information about the firm,
there is no reason to assume this information to be negative, a priori.
Panel C in Table 4.4 presents the event study results for a sub-sample of
19 firms where the stated reason for the directors' resignation was the inability of
the firm to purchase directors and officers liability insurance. The results for this
sample are significantly negative at the 5% level. On average these firms lose
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6.3% of shareholders' value on the announcement of directors' resignations. This
is consistent with the idea that shareholders view the inability of the firm to
purchase D&O liability insurance, and the consequent resignations of directors as
events harmful to the firm in a significant way. Since the resignations occurred
between 1984 and 1986 for all but one of these firms, this result is consistent with
the results for the sub-samples defined by year.
Table 4.5 presents results for comparisons between portfolios. The
purpose of these comparisons is to establish whether or not there is a statistically
significant difference between the various portfolios discussed above. For this
purpose three statistical tests are used: a parametric t-test, a non-parametric Mann-
Whitney test and a non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smimov test. These tests allow
for testing the differences between two portfolios with regard to their mean and
their underlying distribution. Three different tests are used so as not to be
restricted to specific assumptions regarding the portfolios distribution and in order
to control for possible outlier effects.
Panel A in Table 4.5 presents the results of comparing the portfolios of
firms where directors resigned before the liability crisis with those were the
directors resigned following the crisis. All four comparisons of these portfolios
show a significant difference, for the most part at the 1% level. Differences in
mean ranged from 9.9% to 8.7%, while differences in median ranged from 7.1%
to 5.6%. In all cases, resignations during the crisis resulted in significantly lower
(negative) CARs than did resignations after the crisis.
Panel B, Table 4.5 shows the results of comparing the portfolio of 19 firms
where directors resigned explicitly because of lack of liability protection, and all
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other firms (67 firms). The difference in means is 8.4% and in median is 6.6%.
These differences are significant at the 5% level using the t-Test and the Mann-
Whitney test. They are only significant at the 10% level using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test. These results are consistent with the notion that shareholders view
the departure of directors due to increased liability as a negative event.
4.5.2.2 Cross-SectionalRegressions
Additional evidence for the existence of a liability crisis effect on
shareholders' evaluations of directors resignations is provided by studying results
for several cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variable in these
regressions are the CARs over a 3-day period following the announced
resignations of directors. Because of potential heteroscedasticity, each stock's
Cumulative Standardized Prediction Error (CSPE) is also used as a dependent
variable. Since this section is concerned with evidence for the existence of a
liability crisis, the main independent variables will be dummy variables based on
the year of resignation, and a dummy variable for those firms where directors
resigned specifically because of lack of liability insurance.
Table 4.6 presents the results of three regression models. Model 1 uses as
its independent variables a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 for firms
where the resignations of directors occurred between 1984 and 1986 and a
"Liability dummy variable" that takes on the value of 1 for the 19 firms where
directors resigned explicitly because of lack of director liability insurance. Model
2 uses a dummy variable for those resignations between 1988 and 1990 and the
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"Liability" dummy. Finally Model 3 includes only the "Liability" dummy
variable.
All three models in Table 4.6 provide evidence consistent with that
presented in Tables 4.4 and 4.5: the hypothesis that firms reacted negatively to
director resignations during the so called "liability crisis" cannot be rejected at the
1% level. In addition, there is evidence that shareholders reacted positively to
director resignations after the crisis, consistent with the idea that shareholders
view the departure of directors, when these directors can be replaced, as a positive
event. This result could indicate that shareholders view the departure of
directors as a positive change in the structure of the board. As will be discussed
in the next section, this might be the result of the fact that a large fraction of our
sample are of poorly performing firms.
Additionally, Model 3 presents weak direct evidence that shareholders
viewed the issue of liability as significant. When CAR is the dependent variable,
the dummy for the 19 firms where directors resigned because of increased liability
is negative and significant at the 5% level. However, when CSPE is the
dependent variable, this dummy is not significant. In addition, this variable is
statistically insignificant in Models 1 and 2.
The difference in response between the two periods, and the negative
coefficient for the Liability variable are consistent with the idea that during 1987 a
shift occurred in the way shareholders valued resigning directors. As discussed
above, this shift is believed to have happened as a result of the reduced liability
risk faced by directors following statutory changes that occurred during 1987.
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4.5.3 Director Resignation and Firm Performance
4.5.3.1 TotalSample
The previous section documented the shift in shareholders' response to
directors resignations between the period of the liability crisis and the period that
followed it. In this section these results will be further examined while
controlling for the performance of individual firms. The influence of firm
performance on shareholders response to directors' resignations is studied over the
whole period in this section, and for the periods during and after the liability
crisis, in the next.
Table 4.7 summarizes the results for the total sample over the whole time
period. As independent variables, six performance measures are used: the log of
the firm's market value divided by the value of its total assets for the year
preceding the resignations, the firm's operating income divided by total assets and
adjusted for industry, the difference in these measures between the year preceding
the resignations and their value two years before the resignations, and a dummy
variable for low operating firms (LOP) and another dummy for high operating
firms (HOP) (see section 4.4.3 for a detailed description of these variables).
The results in table 4.7 provide no evidence of any relationship between
firm performance and shareholder's response to the resignation of directors. Thus,
for the sample as a whole the value placed on maintaining the board of directors
as it is does not vary with performance. However, the dummy variables
controlling for the period in which the resignation took place are statistically
significant in all the regressions in Table 4.7. This result further establishes that
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there was a significantly different shareholder response to directors resignations
during and after what has been defined as the crisis years. This result holds even
when controlling for various performance measures.
The results in Table 4.7 reinforce the idea that a structural shift occurred
following or during 1987. Because of this evident structural shift, the results in
this Table might not be providing relevant evidence regarding the true relationship
between performance and shareholder value changes that resulted from director
resignations. Therefore, in the next section the relationship between performance
and shareholder response to director resignations will be examined separately, for
the period during the crisis and for the period after it.
4.5.3.2 Sub-Sample (by Period)
Table 4.8 and 4.9 recreate Table 4.7 for the two sub samples divided by
the period of resignation. In Table 4.8 evidence regarding the relationship
between performance and shareholder response to director resignation during the
crisis years (1984-1986) is presented. In all the models tested the coefficient for
the performance variable as measured by the market value divided by total assets
is positive and statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels when CARs and
CSPEs are respectively used as the dependent variables. This result suggests that
shareholders of firms which are performing poorly, based on this measure, react
more negatively to the news of directors resigning that shareholders of better
performing firms.
However, while the result for the market value variable is strong, there is
no evidence from the accounting measures of performance that would confirm it.
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The coefficients for the operating income and the LOP and HOP dummy variables
are insignificant for all the regressions in this period. This, of course, complicates
the issue and suggests that shareholders are not responding to accounting
measures of performance. Rather shareholders react negatively to those firms
which have a dismal future and/or poor management. The variable of market
value divided by total assets proxies here for the firms' future investment
opportunities and projected economic rents in its current form under current
management.
The results imply that during the liability crisis, shareholders of firms
whose future prospects were poor, even if current earnings were not reflective of
this situation, valued their existing directors more than did shareholders of firms
that were doing relatively well. These poorly performing firms could be facing
the prospect of financial distress. These results are consistent with the idea,
presented in chapter 3, that the value of having a functioning, competent board of
directors increases as firms approach financial distress. Therefore, since during
the liability crisis directors who resigned were hard to replace, the value of the
existing board increased for firms facing the possibility of financial distress.
Thus, for these firms maintaining a functioning board with outside directors is
more important than getting rid of the directors who participated in bringing the
company to its dismal current situation.
The results for the sub-period 1988 to 1990, presented in Table 4.9, are
opposite, if somewhat weaker, than those of the 1984 to 1986 period. The
coefficients for the market value to total assets variable is in this case negative and
statistically significant. This suggests that during the period following the
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liability crisis, when it was relatively easy to replace directors, the resignation of
directors in poorly performing firms was viewed as a positive event. The
discussion presented in section 4.3 suggests that since directors were replaceable,
firms that were doing poorly could add value by getting rid of the directors that
were part of the board that brought about the firm's poor performance. Thus, we
observe a shift, not only in the aggregate shareholder response to the resignation
of directors, but also, and possibly primarily in the response of shareholders to
resignations in poorly performing firms.
For the regression in Model 1, Table 4.9 where CARs are the dependent
variable, both the market value divided by total assets and the operating income
measures are negative and statistically significant. In this case the accounting
measure confirms the results obtained by using the market value measure. This
adds some credence to the idea presented above that firms that are doing poorly
are being rewarded for the loss of directors relative to those firms that are doing
relatively well. It should be noted that in no other regression is their a significant
relationship between the accounting performance measures and returns.
In the first regression in Model 1, Table 4.9, the coefficient for Total
Assets is positive and statistically significant. This result is puzzling; for the
period between 1988 and 1990, controlling for firm performance, shareholders
responded more positively to director resignations in large firms than in small
ones.
The results presented in this section provide further evidence of a
structural shift in shareholders attitudes towards the resignations of directors from
the board of directors between the period of the liability crisis and the period that
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followed. While in aggregate, evidence exists that shareholders viewed director
resignations as negative events during the crisis but not after it ended, there is also
evidence that the relationship between performance and shareholder reaction
shifted during these periods. The results support the idea that firms with poor
future prospects were severely penalized when their directors resigned during the
crisis years, but that after the crisis shareholders of similar firms viewed the
resignations as positive events. These results support the hypotheses presented in
section 4.3.
4.5.4 Director Resignations and Board Characteristics
In this section further analysis of the hypotheses presented above is
conducted while controlling for some of the characteristics of each firm's board of
directors. More specifically the following characteristics are looked at: the
percent of the board resigning, the percent of outside directors resigning (from the
pool of outside directors on the board), the percent of outsiders on the board prior
to the resignations, whether or not the CEO, President, or Chairman were among
those resigning, and the ratio between the number of directors resigning and the
number being appointed at the same time.
Tables 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 present the results for three models over the
three sample periods; the total sample over the entire period between 1984 and
1990, the period between 1984 and 1986, and the period between 1988 and 1990.
Each model includes CARs and CSPE as the dependent variables.
In Table 4.10, for the total sample, the negative impact of resignations that
occur during the crisis years is conformed;, in all three models the dummy
63
variable for resignations between 1984 and 1986 is negative and significant at the
1% level.
There is evidence that the resignation of a CEO, President, or Chairman
has a negative impact on shareholder wealth. This result is not consistent with
other literature (Bonnier and Bruner (1989), Furtado and Rozeff (1987), Warner,
Watts and Wruck (1988), Weisbach (1988), Reinganum (1985)), that documents
a non negative response to the announced resignation of a CEO. However, there
might be a connection between the resignation of a CEO and the resignations of
other board members that was not controlled for by these other studies. In any
case, the explanation for this result is not obvious, especially in the case of
relatively poorly performing firms.
For the total sample, the percentage of directors resigning, the percentage
of outside directors resigning, and the percentage of outsiders on the board before
the resignations do not significantly effect shareholders' reaction to the
resignations. An interesting, if unexplainable result in Model 3 is that the
performance variable of the log of market value divided by total assets is
significant at the 5% level. The contradicts results from section 4.5.3 and from
Model 2 that showed no relationship between performance and shareholder
response to the resignations. However, since it has already been established that
there was a structural shift in the way shareholders reacted to directors
resignations, the results for the total sample cannot be viewed as very revealing.
More interesting and meaningful results are presented in Tables 4.11 and
4.12. These regressions emulate the total sample regressions for the two sub
samples; resignations that occurred during and after the crisis.
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Table 4.11 present results for the period of the liability crisis, 1984-1986.
The results in Models 2 and 3 confirm the positive relationship between
performance and shareholders' response to the resignations. In both cases the
coefficients for the market value variable are positive and significant. In addition,
weak evidence is provided (weak because this variable is not significant when
CSPE is used as the dependent variable), that during this period the appointment
of new directors immediately (within 3 days) after the resignations of old directors
is valuable to shareholders (models 2 and 3). The greater the ratio of directors
appointed to those resigning, the more positive shareholders respond to the
resignations. This is consistent with the notion that during this period directors
were hard to find, and that the ability of the firm to replace all or part of its
directors was a positive signal to shareholders.
In Models 1 and 3, the coefficient for the percent of outside directors
resigning (percent of outsiders on board before the resignations that resigned) is
negative and statistically significant. This is consistent with the notion that
shareholders view outside directors as valuable, and that during the liability crisis,
when outside directors were hard to recruit, their loss was perceived as a negative
event. On the other hand, the coefficient for the overall percentage of directors
resigning from the board is positive and significant. Controlling for the outside
directors, this variable captures shareholders response to the resignation of inside
and gray directors. The positive response on behalf of shareholders to the
resignation of these directors is evidence to the fact that there was no crisis with
regard to hiring new inside or gray directors. In addition, when considering the
fact that many of these companies are under-performers, the resignation and
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possible replacement of insiders could be viewed as beneficial. Consistent with
this result is the fact that for this period shareholders reaction to the resignation of
a CEO, President or Chairman is not significantly negative at it is for the period
following the "crisis". Thus, it can be concluded that shareholders are primarily
reacting negatively to the loss of outside directors during the director liability
crisis.
The coefficient for the percentage of outside directors on the board before
the resignations, in model 4 and 6, is negative and significant. Thus, holding the
percent of outside and other directors resigning constant, the more outside
directors on a given board the more negative shareholders response is. This could
mean that when a given percentage of outside directors resign from boards in
which they have a high percentage of members, shareholders view this as a more
negative event than if the same percentage of outsiders resigned from a board
were their were only a few outsiders. This result is puzzling. Shareholders thus
view the resignation of directors from a board dominated by outsiders as a more
negative event than otherwise. It is possible that the reason for this is that in firms
where outsiders dominate there would be less reason for outside directors to leave,
thus their departure might signal a more substantial problem than otherwise.
The results for the 1988 to 1990 sub-period, presented in Table 4.12,
reaffirm the negative relationship between performance and shareholders'
response to directors resignations. In addition, there is evidence that the
resignation of a CEO, President, or Chairman during this period had a significant
negative effect on shareholder wealth (Models 2 and 3). On the other hand,
except in the case of these top executives, there is no evidence that the type or
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number of directors resigning had in itself any effect on shareholders. The
coefficient for the ratio of appointed directors to resigning directors is not
statistically significant. This is consistent with the hypothesis that following the
liability crisis, when it was relatively easy to find new directors, shareholders
placed no special value on appointing new directors as soon as the old directors
resigned.
In summary, the regressions in Table 4.10 through 4.12 provide additional
evidence as to the differences in shareholder reactions to director resignations
between the liability crisis period and the period following it. There is evidence
that during the crisis shareholders reacted negatively to directors' resignations,
especially the resignations of outside directors. In addition, shareholders viewed
the immediate replacement of directors as a positive event due to the difficulties
in attracting directors. On the other hand, following the crisis years, whether or
not the CEO, President, or Chairman resigned had significant impact on
shareholders response, while during the crisis the resignation of one of these
office holders seems to be of lessor significance.
4.5.5 Director Resignations and Other Events
In this section, other events, both directly related and unrelated to the
directors' resignations, are analyzed for possible effects on shareholder's reaction.
First, the stated reasons for the directors resignations are analyzed with respect to
their effect on shareholders response to the resignations themselves. Second,
other events that occur simultaneously with the announced resignations and that
might have an effect on shareholders are analyzed..
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4.5.5.1 Reasons forResignation
Of the 86 resignations in the total sample, in 61 an explicit reason for the
resignation was provided. This section analyzes shareholders' response to the
resignations while controlling for the reason provided. It is important to realize
that the reasons given for a directors' resignation do not necessarily coincide with
the real reason for his departure. However, while this is probably true in some of
the cases presented here it is impossible to identify these cases and separate them
from the rest.
Panel A in Table 4.13 provides data on various portfolios established
based on a similarity in the reason provided for the resignation. The largest
portfolio (25 firms) includes those resignations where no reason for the
resignation is provided. No expectation regarding shareholder response can be
made in this case, and indeed the mean return for the portfolio, while slightly
positive, is statistically insignificant. The second largest portfolio is made up of
the 19 firms from which directors resigned because of their firm's inability to
provide adequate liability insurance for them. As already observed in section
4.5.2, the expected and the actual result is a significant negative shareholder
response.
The only other significantly large portfolio includes those resignations
brought about by a change in the firms ownership (17). A change in ownership is
defined as any significant sale of shares by a beneficial shareholder, or a purchase
of more than 5% of the firm stock. However, this does not include mergers, or
takeovers where the ownership and control change. If the news report announcing
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the resignation, explains it by reference to an ownership change, that firm is
included in this portfolio. The resignation of old directors to make room for new
directors that results from such a change in ownership should have a non negative
market response. It is natural for new owners to seek representation on the board,
and for representatives of old owners to resign. Indeed, the markets response to
these firm was slightly positive (2.2%) but not statistically significant.
The rest of the portfolios are small. However it is important to note that
for two small portfolios the markets reaction to the resignations was statistically
significant (although these results should be somewhat suspect given the small
number of firms in each portfolio.) For those firms where directors resigned
because of the firms' restructuring (7 firms) the market responded very positively
to the resignations (mean of 13.70%, median of 3.4%). This result might reflect
the fact that actual changes in the board of directors are evidence of the degree to
which management is serious about an announced restructuring. The other
portfolio that generates significant returns is for those firms whose directors
resigned for personal reasons. This portfolio contains only 4 firms and therefore
the significance of this result is questionable. In any case this could be an
example were the real reason for the resignation is not provided, and "personal
reasons" is used instead.
In Panel B of Table 4.13, several of the portfolios from Panel A are
aggregated. Thus, the portfolios that included as reasons for resignations changes
in ownership and mergers are combined (22 firms) into one portfolio. The
resulting mean CAR is positive but not statistically significant. This is the same
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result achieved when all the other portfolios excluding the "Liability" and the "no
reason given" portfolios are aggregated.
Panel C presents comparisons of the aggregate portfolios with the
remaining sample. The first comparison is identical to that presented in Panel B
of Table 4.5, and establishes that the "Liability" portfolio has significantly lower
CARs than the rest of the sample. This is the only significantly different
portfolio. Thus, it can be concluded that this analysis provides little evidence that
any of the reasons given for the directors resignations, excluding the lack of
Liability, provide information as to shareholders response to these resignations.
Tables 4.14 through 4.16 add to this analysis by looking at cross sectional
regressions using the portfolios described above as determinants for dummy
variables. In addition to examining the total sample, the regression analysis
allows for an analysis of the two sub-samples based on when the resignations
occurred.
The two significant coefficients, for the total sample in Table 4.14, are for
those firms where the resignations were the result of restructuring, and where they
were the result of the firms' inability to purchase D&O liability insurance. This
result is consistent with the portfolio analysis above. However, as can be seen in
Table 4.16, the restructuring variable is only significant for the 1988-1990 sub-
period. In the 1984-1986 sub-period (4.15) none of the dummy variables are
significant. The three firms from which directors resigned during the 1988-1990
period, due to restructuring, are significant in explaining a substantial part of the
variation in returns during this period. The importance of this result is that in
order to make accurate statements regarding shareholders responses to directors
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resignations during this period it becomes essential to control for the
"restructuring" firms. In addition, it is important to note that for the period of the
crisis no one reason for the directors resignations dominated. The negative
response to the resignations was consistent throughout the sample during this
period.
For both time periods, controlling for the reason for resignation, did not
mitigate the strong explanatory power of the Market Value over Total Assets
variable. Consistent with previous regressions, this variable was significant and
positive for the "crisis'' period and negative and significant for the years following
the crisis.
4.5.5.2. Other ConcurrentEvents
The news releases that announced the directors' resignations were
carefully scanned for possible confounding events, i.e., events that could,
independent of the resignation, result in a shareholder response that could
influence the excess returns measured following the resignations. 46 firms had at
least one otheroccurrence that could possibly result in shareholders response.
Table 4.17, Panel A provides CARs for portfolios defined by type of
event. Panel B provides comparisons between portfolios defined by specific
events and the rest of the sample. Of these portfolios three have significant
CARs; the portfolio defined by changes in ownership, and the portfolio of misc.'
events. Changes in ownership as an event occurring concurrently with the
resignations seems to have a positive impact on CARs. However, Panel B
provides only weak evidence that this portfolio is truly different from the rest of
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the sample. The same seems to be true of the misc.' portfolio and the portfolio of
firms were the CEO President or Chairman resigned with the directors. While the
effect of these portfolios on CARs is negative, there is no significantly difference
between them and the rest of the sample.
Tables 4.18 through 4.20 present regression results for dummy variables
whose definition is the same as for the portfolios above. What is obvious here, as
with the results in previous sections, is the different influence of the various
variables in the different sub-periods. For the 1988-1990 sub-period (Table 4.20)
none of the dummy variables is significant. For the total sample (Table 4.18),
when CPSE is the dependent variable, the ownership variable is positive and
statistically significant. In the 1984-1986 sub-period (Table 4.19) this variable is
significantly positive for both dependent variables. Thus, changes in ownership
that are announced concurrently with the announcement of directors resigning,
have a positive effect on shareholder value during the crisis years. This is
consistent with the idea that the replacement of directors is natural following
ownership changes, and that such changes mitigate the negative effects associated
with directors' resignations during the crisis years. This is especially true given
the fact that most of the firms in the sample are not firms that are performing well.
Thus, a change in directors that is associated with a change in ownership is
viewed as positive.
In all the regressions for the sub-periods, the coefficient for the market
value to total assets variable is statistically significant. Thus, even when
controlling for various potentially contaminating events, the relationship observed
above, between performance and directors resignations, holds.
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4.6 Summary
This chapter documents shareholder's average wealth effects resulting
from director resignations. Evidence that shareholders responded differently to
directors' resignation during and after the so called "liability crisis" is presented.
These results suggest that such a crisis did indeed occur, and that as a result
director resignations during this period had a significant negative impact on
shareholder wealth.
In addition, evidence is presented that shareholders of poorly performing
firms value the services provided by outside directors. When replacements for
these directors are hard to find, for example during the liability crisis, the
resignation of directors resulted in a more negative response than for better
performing firms. Alternatively, after the crisis shareholders of poorly performing
firms reacted positively to resignation of directors, as it signaled a change from
the board that had brought the company to its weak position. Thus, in both cases
shareholders of poorly performing firms, through their reaction to directors
resignations, express the value they place on having a functioning board which
includes outsiders.
The evidence presented in this paper suggest that sometime around 1987 a
significant shift occurred in the governance of US corporations. This shift should
be considered in future studies examining governance issues around this period.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics - Resignations (of at least two directors) and
Appointments
Panel A: Total Sample
Mean Median
# of Firms Resignations Appointments Resignations Appointments
Total Sample 86 3.407 1.302 3 1
Panel B: Sub samples by Year
Mean Median
Year # of Firms Resignations Appointments Resignations Appointments
1984 2 4 0 4 0
1985 14 4.14 1.86 4 1.5
1986 25 3.6 0.76 4 0
1987 8 2.88 1 2 1
1988 11 2.91 1.36 3 0
1989 7 4.29 2.29 4 2
1990 19 2.74 1.47 2 1
1984-1986 41 3.805 1.098 4 0
1984-1987 49 3.653 1.082 3 1
1988-1990 37 3.081 1.595 3 1
1987-1990 45 3.044 1.489 3 1
Panel C: Comparison of Portfolios (1984-1986 vs. 1988-1990)
Difference Difference Mann- Kolmogorov
in Mean in Median t-Test Whitney - Smirnov
Resignations 0.724 1 2.00** 1.63 4.454
Appointments -0.497 -1 1.446 1.298 3.27
Res. - App. 1.221 0 3.06* 2.740* 4.333
App. / Res. -0.196 -0.5 1.838*** 1 701*** 7.627**
* Statistically significant at the 1% level,
**
at the 5% level, *** at the 10% level.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics - Board Characteristics
Year
Number of
Observations
f
Size of
Board
5anel A: T
Mean
Percent of
Outside
Directors
otal Sampl
Percent of
Outside
Directors
Resigning
e
Size of
Board
Median
Percent of
Outside
Directors
Percent of
Outside
Directors
Resigning
Total 76 8.842 57.70% 63.40% 9 60.00% 63.30%
Sample
Panel B: Sub samples by Year
Mean Median
Percent of Percent of Percent of Percent of
Outside. Outside
Number of Size of Outside Directors Size of Outside Directors
Year Observations Board Directors Resigning Board Directors Resigning
1984 2 9.5 58.30% 65.00% 9.5 58.30% 65.00%
1985 13 11.54 60.20% 57.20% 12 66.70% 50.00%
1986 24 8.25 56.40% 71.30% 8.25 57.10% 66.70%
1987 7 8.86 55.70% 52.10% 8 53.30% 40.00%
1988 7 8.86 56.30% 57.30% 9 62.50% 66.70%
1989 6 7.5 54.00% 86.10% 7 55.00% 100.00%
1990 17 8 60.40% 55.80% 7 57.10% 50.00%
1984-1986 39 9.41 57.70% 66.30% 9 60.00% 66.70%
1984-1987 46 9.33 57.40% 64.10% 9 60.00% 63.30%
1988-1990 30 8.1 58.20% 62.20% 7 58.60% 63.30%
1987-1990 37 8.24 57.70% 60.30% 8 57.10% 60.00%
Panel C: Comparison of Portfolios (1984-1986 vs. 1988-1990)
Difference Difference Mann- Kolmogorov
in Mean in Median t-Test Whitney - Smirnov
Board Size 1.31 2 1.65 1.98** 5.105
% Out. Dir. -0.40% 1.40% 0.1 0.94 1.5
% Outside
Dir. Res. 4.10% 3.40% 0.53 0.08 1.16
* Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 10% level
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics - Performance Measures
Year
Number
of
Firms
Total
Assets
(0000)
Pa
Mean
Market
Value /
Total
Assets
nel A: Tot
Industry
Adjusted
OPINC/
Total
Assets
al Samp
Total
Assets
(0000)
e
Median
Market
Value /
Total
Assets
Industry
Adjusted
OPINC/
Total
Assets
#of
LOP
Firms
#of
HOP
Firms
Total
Sample
86 639.2 0.844 -0.1 89.713 0.735 -0.074 32 11
Panel B: Sub samples by Year
Mean Median
Number Total Market Industry Total Market Industry #of #of
Adjusted Adjusted
of Assets Value / OPINC / Assets Value / OPINC/ LOP HOP
Year Firms (0000) Total Total (0000) Total Total Firm Firms
Assets Assets Assets Assets s
1984 2 125.6 0.752 -0.033 125.6 0.752 -0.033 0 0
1985 13 2324.7 0.668 -0.097 101.4 0.735 -0.04 5 5
1986 24 209.5 0.915 -0.154 94.9 0.701 -0.139 8 2
1987 7 333.4 1.053 0.024 206.6 0.821 0.028 1 2
1988 7 400.7 0.966 -0.069 49.08 0.857 0.016 4 2
1989 6 173.6 0.859 -0.069 45.05 0.734 -0.035 3 0
1990 17 455.2 0.724 -0.121 44.1 0.702 -0.117 11 0
1984-1986 41 927.6 0.823 -0.129 94.9 0.702 -0.116 13 7
1984-1987 49 830.6 0.86 -0.104 106.3 0.702 -0.076 14 9
1988-1990 37 385.7 0.822 -0.095 45.1 0.736 -0.072 18 2
1987-1990 45 376.4 0.863 -0.074 54.5 0.736 -0.044 19 4
Panel C: Comparison of Portfolios (1984-1986 vs 1988-1990)
Difference. Difference.
in in Mann- Kolmogorov
Mean Median t-Test Whitney - Smirnov
Total assets 541.9 49.8 1 2.096** 8.417**
MV/TA 0.001 -0.034 0 0.3 2.765
Adjusted
OPINC/TA -0.033 -0.188 0.903 0.745 2.902
* Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, ***at the 10% level
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Table 4.4: Market Reaction (CARs) to Directors Resignations
Panel A: Total Sample
Year # of Firms Mean CAR z # Negative p-value for
sign test
median
CAR
Total
Sample
86 0.20% 0.92 45 0.80 -0.50%
Panel B: Sub samples by Year
Year (a) # of Firms Mean CAR z # Negative p-value for
sign test
median
CAR
1984 2 -7.00% 0.91 1 0.99 -7.00%
1985 14 -5.50% 2.60* 8 0.21 -2.70%
1986 25 -4.50% 2.78* 19** 0.02 -4.70%
1987 8 1.00% 0.26 2 0.71 2.10%
1988 11 1.80% 0.15 5 0.99 2.60%
1989 7 10.40% 2.98* 2 0.45 8.00%
1990 19 6.40% 1.88*** 8 0.35 1.70%
1984-1986 41 -4.90% 3.88* 28** 0.03 -4.60%
1984-1987 49 -4.00% 3.44* 30 0.152 -3.50%
1988-1990 37 5.80% 2.56** 15 0.68 2.60%
1988,1990 30 4.70% 1.4 13 0.58 2.10%
Panel C: Subsample - Liability as Cause for Resignation
Year (a) # of Firms Mean CAR z # Negative p-value for
sign test
median
CAR
Liability 19 -6.30% 2.419** 14*** 0.06 -5.90%
* Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 10% level.
Table 4.5: Market Reaction (CARs) to Directors Resignations - Portfolio
Comparison
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Panel A: Comparison of Portfolios - By Year
Difference.
in
Mean
Difference.
in
Median t-Test
Mann-
Whitney
Kolmogorov
- Smirnov
1984-1986 vs. Rest of Sample 9.90% 7.10% 3.62* 3.73* 15.85*
1984-1986 vs. 1988-1990 8.70% 5.60% 2.948* 3.627* 13.933*
1988-1990 vs. Rest of Sample -9.80% -6.10% 3.543* 3.258* 10.215**
1988,1990 vs. 1984-1987 -8.70% -5.60% 2.948* 2.596* 7.162***
Panel B: Comparison of Liability Portfolio with Rest of Sample
Difference.
in
Mean
Difference.
in
Median t-Test
Mann-
Whitney
Kolmogorov
- Smirnov
Liability vs. Rest of Sample -8.40% -6.60% 2.47** 2.55** 7 24***
* Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 10% level.
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Table 4.6: Summary Table for Regressions - By Year (Total Sample)
86 Firms, Depende
Model
CARs
nt Variable
1
CSPEs
s - CARs,
Model
CARs
CSPEs (t-St
2
CSPEs
at in parent
Model
CARs
heses)
3
CSPEs
Intercept 0.05
(2.650)*
0.362
(1.856)***
-0.025
(1.082)
-0.453
(1.879)***
0.021
(1.297)
0.03
(0.179)
Years
1984-1986
-0.085
(2.698)*
-0.969
(2.966)*
Years
1988-1990
0.083
(2.665)*
0.874
(2.696)*
Liability (a) -0.033
(0.858)
0
(0.001)
-0.038
(1.032)
-0.102
(0.265)
-0.084
(2.467)**
-0.585
(1.65)
F Statistic for
Regression
6.911* 5.879* 6.814* 5.087* 6.086** 2.707
R Squared
Adjusted
14.30%
(12.20%)
12.40%
(10.30%)
14.10%
(12.00%)
10.90%
(8.80%)
6.80%
(5.60%)
3.10%
(2.00%)
Two Tailed Significance
* Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 10% level.
a) Liability - In the resignation announcement it states that the Directors resigned because of lack
of adequate D&O Liability Insurance for their firm.
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Table 4.7: Summary Table forRegressions - By Performance Measures (Total
Sample)
86 Firms, Depend ent Variable
Mod
CARs
s - CARs, C
el 1
CSPE
SPEs (t-stat
Mod
CARs
in parenthes
el 2
CSPE
es)
Intercept -0.015
(0.303)
0.092
(0.177)
0.012
(1.059)
0.398
(0.815)
Years 1984-1986 -0.114
(3.885)*
-1.036
(3.392)*
-0.087
(3.562)*
-0.901
(2.999)*
Ln(MV/TA) 0
(0.036)
0.03
(0.133)
_
“
Ln(MV/TA) - Lagl
of Ln(MV/TA)
“ “ 0.021
(0.97)
0.164
(0.62)
Adj(Opine) -0.144
(1.382)
-0.913
(0.84)
Adj(Opine) - Lagl
of Adj (Opine)
-0.124
(1.501)
-0.683
(0.67)
Low Operating
performance
-0.006
(0.185)
0.166
(.511)
0.013
(0.508)
0.261
(0.816)
High Operating
Performance
0.005
(0.107)
0.274
(0.541)
0.034
(0.84)
0.387
(0.78)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.013
(1.375)
0.028
(0.283)
0
(0.589)
-0.061
(0.628)
Number of Firms 86 86 82 82
F Statistic for
Regression
2.616** 2.078*** 2.746** 2.002***
R Squared
Adjusted
16.60%
(10.20%)
13.60%
(7.10%)
18.00%
(11.50%)
13.80%
(6.90%)
Two Tailed Significance
* Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, ***at the 10% level.
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Table 4.8: Summary Table forRegressions - By Performance Measures for the
Liability Crisis (1984-1986 Sample)
41 Firms, Dependent Variables - CARs, CSPEs (t-stat in parentheses)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
CARs CSPE CARs CSPE CARs CSPE CARs CSPE
Intercept -0.03 -0.153 -0.02 0.13 -0.02 -0.159 -0.031 0.201
(0.526) (0.212) (0.409) (0.213) (0.33) (0.206) (0.575) (0.292)
Ln(MV/TA) 0.085 0.647 0.082 0.662 0.082 0.663 - -
(3.610)* (2.16)** (3.33)* (2.12)** (3.279)* (2.09)**
Ln(MV/TA) - Lagl - - - - - - 0.083 0.54
of Ln(MV/TA) (3.021)* (1.53)
Adj(OpInc) 0.011 0.025 - - -0.001 -0.086 - -
(0.105) (0.019) (0.00) (0.06)
Adj(Opine) -Lagl - - - - - - -0.13 -0.824
of Adj(OpInc) (1.13) (0.56)
Low Operating - - 0.003 0.234 -0.007 0.234 -0.019 0.125
performance (0.197) (0.537) (0.194) (0.529) (0.521) (0.265)
High Operating - - 0.027 0.372 0.027 0.38 0.043 0.507
Performance (0.54) (0.58) (0.52) (0.57) (0.77) (0.71)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.003 -0.044 0.004 -0.077 -0.001 -0.074 -0.003 -0.11
(0.281) (0.355) (0.042) (0.591) (0.035) (0.512) (0.365) (0.807)
Number of Firms 41 41 41 41 41 41 40 40
F Statistic for 4.410* 1.738 3.348** 1.413 2.604** 1.1 2 0.683
Regression
R Squared 26.3% 12.4% 27.1% 13.6% 27.1% 13.6% 25.4% 9.1%
Adjusted (20.4%) (5.2%) (19.0%) (4.0%) (16.7%) (1.2%) (14.4%) (0.0%)
Two Tailed Significance
* Statistically significant at the 1% level,
** at the 5% level, *** at the 10% level.
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Table 4.9: Summary Table for Regressions - By Performance Measures for the
Post-crisis Period (1988-1990 Sample)
37 Firms, Dependent Variables - CARs, CSPEs (t-stat in parentheses)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
CARs CSPE CARs CSPE CARs CSPE CARs CSPE
Intercept -0.145 -0.662 -0.084 -0.396 -0.165 -0.801 0.003 -0.027
(2.098)** (1.024) (1.094) (0.577) (1 99)*** (1.027) (0.006) (0.036)
Ln(MWTA) -0.086 -0.589 -0.075 -0.508 -0.091 -0.589 - -
(2.578)** (1 91)*** (2.082)** (1.574) (2.589)** (1.78)***
Ln(MV/TA) - Lagl - - - - - - -0.068 -0.419
of Ln(MV/TA) (195)*** (0.98)
Adj(Opine) -0.32 -1.852 - - -0.38 -1.886 - -
(2.049)** (1.273) (2.048)** (1.09)
Adj(Opine) - Lagl - - - - - - -0.217 -1.149
of Adj(Opine) (1.584) (0.69)
Low Operating - - 0.016 0.235 0 0.152 0.041 0.339
performance (0.32) (0.512) (0.001) (0.327) (1.047) (0.715)
High Operating - - -0.031 -0.333 0.079 0.214 -0.051 -0.542
Performance (0.28) (0.34) (0.67) (0.19) (0.62) (0.55)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.034 0.166 0.026 0.128 0.036 0.179 0 0.028
(2.46)** (1.28) (1.78)*** (0.978) (2.45)** (1.287) (0.047) (0.179)
Number of Firms 37 37 37 37 37 37 34 34
F Statistic for 4.290** 1.801 1.938 1.007 2.544** 1.045 1.639 0.481
Regression
R Squared 28.10% 14.10% 19.50% 11.20% 29.10% 14.40% 22.60% 7.90%
Adjusted (21.5%) (6.3%) (9.4%) (0.8%) (17.7%) (0.6%) (8.8%) (0.0%)
Two Tailed Significance
* Statistically significant at the 1% level,
** at the 5% level, *** at the 10% level.
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Table 4.10: Summary Table for Regressions - By Board Characteristics (Total
Sample)
86 Firms, Dep>endent Va
Moc
CARs
riables - C
lei 1
CSPE
:ars, csf
Moc
CARs
( Es (t-stat
lei 2
CSPE
in parentht
Moc
CARs
sses)
lei 3
CSPE
Intercept 0.046
(0.507)
0.07
(2.700)*
0.155
(01.456)
Year of Resignation
Between 1984-1986
-0.091
(3.139)*
-0.107
(3.871)*
-0.092
(3.240)*
% ofDirectors
that Resigned
-0.018
(0.121)
0.097
(0.57)
% of Outside Directors
that Resigned
0.008
(0.079)
-0.125
(0.999)
% of Outside Directors
on the Board (a)
0.01
(0.083)
-0.116
(0.9)
CEO or PRES or
CHAIR (b)
-0.068
(2.249)**
-0.077
(1.838)***
Appointed /
Resigned (c)
0.004
(0.144)
0.006
(0.199)
LN (market Value/
Total Assets)
-0.003
(0.159)
-0.053
(2.142)**
Number of firms 76 76 86 86 76 76
F Statistic for
Regression
(2.513)** (2.513)** (4.639)* (4.639)* (2.754)** (2.754)**
R Squared
Adjusted
12.40%
(7.50%)
12.40%
(7.50%)
18.60%
(14.60%)
18.60%
(14.60%)
22.10%
(14.10%)
22.10%
(14.10%)
Two Tailed Significance
* Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, ***at the 10% level.
a) % of Outside Directors on the Board before the resignations.
b) CEO_PRES_CH is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the CEO, President, or
Chairman are among the directorsresigning.
c) Appointed / Resigned is the number of newly appointed directors divided by the number of
directors that resigned. Both appointments and resignations are announced at the same time.
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Table 4.11: Summary Table for Regressions -By Board Characteristics for the
Crisis Period (1984-1986 Sample)
41 Firms, Dependent Va
Moc
CARs
riables - C
lei 1
CSPE
:ars, csf
Moc
CARs
}Es (t-stat
lei 2
CSPE
in parenth
Moc
CARs
ieses)
lei 3
CSPE
Intercept 0.192
(1.841)***
1.327
(0.886)
-0.033
(1.675)
-0.385
(1.51)
0.182
(1.754)***
1.686
(1.136)
% ofDirectors
that Resigned
0.307
(2.339)**
3.197
(1.697)***
0.388
(2.849)*
5.018
(2.573)**
% ofOutside Directors
that Resigned
-0.262
(2.460)**
-1.778
(1.162)
-0.297
(2.684)**
-2.89
(1.827)***
% of Outside Directors
on the Board (a)
-0.326
(2.509)**
-3.565
(1.910)***
-0.322
(2.578)**
-3.881
(2.169)**
CEO or PRES or
CHAIR (b)
-0.015
(0.429)
-0.559
(1.255)
-0.031
(0.389)
-0.895
(1.755)***
Appointed /
Resigned (c)
0.069
(2.031)**
0.5
(1.143)
0.056
(1.951)***
0.496
(1.209)
LN (market Value /
Total Assets)
0.092
(4.027)*
0.767
(2.298)*
0.046
(1.850)***
0.6
(1.701)***
Number of firms 39 39 41 41 39 39
F Statistic for
Regression
(2.467)*** (2.393)*** (6.50)* (3.02)** (2.616)** (2.627)**
R Squared
Adjusted
17.50%
(10.40%)
17.00%
(9.90%)
34.50%
(29.20%)
19.70%
(13.20%)
32.90%
(20.30%)
33.00%
(20.40%)
Two Tailed Significance
* Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 10% level.
a) % of Outside Directors on the Board before the resignations.
b) CEO_PRES_CH is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the CEO, President, or
Chairman are among the directors resigning.
c) Appointed / Resigned is the number of newly appointed directors divided by the number of
directors that resigned. Both appointments and resignations are announced at the same time.
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Table 4.12: Summary Table for Regressions - By Board Characteristics for the
Post-crisis Period (1988-1990 Sample)
37 Firms, Dependent Va
Moc
CARs
riables
- C
lei 1
CSPE
:ars, csf
Moc
CARs
’Es (t-stat
lei 2
CSPE
in parenth
Moc
CARs
ieses)
lei 3
CSPE
Intercept -0.027
(0.161)
0.003
(0.002)
0.686
(1.829)***
0.627
(2.043)**
0.074
(.376)
1.859
(1.22)
% of Directors
that Resigned
-0.37
(0.982)
-4.499
(1.464)
-0.271
(0.661)
-2.107
(0.663)
% of Outside Directors
that Resigned
0.191
(0.845)
2.809
(1.517)
0.0655
(0.246)
0.389
(0.188)
% ofOutside Directors
on the Board (a)
0.204
(0.923)
0.947
(0.526)
0.042
(0.168)
-1.563
(0.809)
CEO_PRES_CH (b) -0.091
(1.826)***
-1.176
(2.888)*
-0.084
0.941
-1.445
(2.081)**
Appointed /
Resigned (c)
-0.022
(0.472)
-0.065
(0.169)
0.003
(0.048)
0.19
(0.395)
LN (market Value /
Total Assets)
-0.081
(2.330)**
-0.606
(2.119)**
-0.132
(2.891)*
-1.01
(2.859)*
Number offirms 30 30 37 37 30 30
F Statistic for
Regression
(0.409) (1.028) (2.787)** (4.013)** (1.801) (2.815)**
R Squared
Adjusted
4.50%
(0.00%)
10.60%
(0.30%)
20.20%
(13.00%)
26.70%
(20.10%)
31.90%
(14.20%)
42.30%
(27.30%)
Two Tailed Significance
* Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 10% level.
a) % of Outside Directors on the Board before the resignations.
b) CEO_PRES_CH is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the CEO, President, or
Chairman are among the directors resigning.
c) Appointed / Resigned is the number of newly appointed directors divided by the number of
directors that resigned. Both appointments and resignations are announced at the same time.
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Table 4.13: Market Reaction (CARs) to Directors Resignations - Reason for
Resignation (Total Sample)
Panel A: Portfoli
Reason
os base
#of
Obs.
d on the
Mean
? reason
z
given fo
#
Negative
r a direc
p-Value
dor's re
median
signal
# in
84-86
ion
# in
88-90
No Reason Given 25 1.10% 0.12 13 0.99 -0.10% 8 37
Liability 19 -6.30% 2.419** 14 0.06*** -5.90% 18 0
Change in Ownership 17 2.70% 0.519 6 0.33 2.50% 5 10
Restructuring 7 13.70% 2.254** 1 0.13 3.40% 3 3
Disputes Among Board 5 -0.90% 1.328 3 0.99 -0.80% 2 3
Merger 5 -1.00% 0.507 4 0.38 -1.70% 2 3
Personal 4 -9.50% 2.092** 3 0.63 -9.10% 2 2
Directors Bid for Comp. 3 1.60% 0.568 1 0.99 3.90% 2 0
Other 3 6.80% 1.353 0 0.25 4.30% 1 1
Panel B: Aggregated Portfolios based on the reason given for a director's
resignation
Ownership Changes and
Mergers
22 1.90% 0.216 10 0.83 1.60% 7 13
All Reasons (Except
Ownership Changes,
Mergers, and Liability)
20 3.60% 0.358 8 0.50 1.20% 10 9
All Reasons (Except
Liability)
42 2.70% 0.402 18 0.44 1.60% 17 22
Panel C: Comparison of Aggregated Portfolios
Difference.
in
Mean
Difference.
in
Median t-Test
Mann-
Whitney
Kolmogor
ov
- Smirnov
Liability vs. Rest of Sample -8.40% -6.60% 2.47** 2.55** 7 i4***
No Reason vs. Rest of Sample 1.20% -1.10% 0.367 0.452 1.876
Ownership and Mergers vs.
Rest of Sample
2.20% 2.40% 0.671 1.089 2.817
All Reasons (except Liability)
vs. Rest of Sample
4.80% 2.10% 1.671*** j 711*** 4.314
* Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 10% level.
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Table 4.14: Summary Table for Regressions - Reasons for Resignations (Total
Sample)
86 Firms, Deptmdent Vai
Mod
CARs
iables - C
lei 1
CSPE
ARs, CSP
Mod
CARs
Es (t-stat
lei 2
CSPE
in parenth
Mod
CARs
eses)
lei 3
CSPE
Intercept -0.003
(0.168)
-0.156
(0.702)
0.008
(0.274)
-0.034
(0.089)
0.008
(0.284)
-0.033
(0.112)
Liability -0.064
(1.799)***
-0.418
(1.109)
-0.074
(1.825)***
-0.531
(1.253)
-0.074
(1.934)***
-0.531
(1.261)
Change in Ownership 0.028
(0.764)
0.268
(0.684)
“
Restructuring 0.139
(2.652)*
1.002
(1.796)***
- - -
*
Change in Ownership
or Merger
- - 0.009
(0.237)
0.073
(0.180)
"
AH Reasons Except
Ownership, mergers
and Liability
0.027
(0.658)
0.11
(0.26)
AH Reasons Except
Liability
- - - - 0.071
(0.515)
0.09
(0.256)
LN (market Value /
Total Assets)
-0.008
(0.380)
-0.04
(0.179)
-0.006
(0.271)
-0.021
(0.089)
-0.005
(0.248)
-0.02
(0.085)
Number offirms 86 86 86 86 86 86
F Statistic for
Regression
(3.378)** (1.514) (1.593) (0.672) (2.092)*** (0.904)
R Squared
Adjusted
14.30%
(10.10%)
7.00%
(2.40%)
7.30%
(2.70%)
3.20%
(0.00%)
7.10%
(3.70%)
3.20%
(0.00%)
Two Tailed Significance
* Statistically significant at the 1% level,
**
at the 5% level, *** at the 10% level.
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Table 4.15: Summary Table for Regressions - Reasons for Resignations for the
Crisis Period( 1984-1986 Sample)
41 Firms, Dep(mdent Vai
Mod
CARs
iables - C
lei 1
CSPE
ARs, CSP
Mod
CARs
Es (t-stat
lei 2
CSPE
in parenth
Mod
CARs
eses)
lei 3
CSPE
Intercept -0.016
(0.634)
-0.455
(1.371)
0
(0.013)
-0.022
(0.049)
0
(0.027)
-0.033
(0.074)
Liability -0.015
(0.466)
0.14
(0.330)
-0.031
(0.770)
0.253
(0.497)
-0.031
(0.769)
-0.251
(0.500)
Change in Ownership 0.03
(0.607)
0.014
(0.023)
"
~
Restructuring 0.008
(0.133)
0.325
(0.417)
" “ ~
Change in Ownership
or Merger
0.008
(0.164)
-0.392
(0.632)
~
All Reasons Except
Ownership, mergers
and Liability
-0.031
(0.64)
-0.686
(1.124)
All Reasons Except
Liability
" “ ~ -0.012
(0.287)
-0.543
(1.036)
LN (market Value /
Total Assets)
0.083
(3.472)*
0.648
(2.113)**
0.086
(3.613)*
0.741
(2.441)**
0.084
(3.553)*
0.72
(2.423)**
Number of firms 41 41 41 41 41 41
F Statistic for
Regression
(3.484)** (1.290) (3.598)** (1.601) (4.639)* (2.105)
R Squared
Adjusted
27.90%
(19.90%)
12.50%
(2.80%)
28.60%
(20.60%)
15.10%
(5.70%)
27.30%
(21.40%)
14.60%
(7.70%)
Two Tailed Significance
* Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level,
***
at the 10% level.
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Table 4.16 Summary Table for Regressions - Reasons for Resignations for the
Post-crisis Period( 1988-1990 Sample)
37 Firms, Dep(indent Vai
Mod
CARs
'iables - C
lei 1
CSPE
ARs, CSP
Moc
CARs
Es (t-stat
lei 2
CSPE
in parenth
Mod
CARs
eses)
lei 3
CSPE
Intercept -0.008
(0.279)
-0.14
(.522)
0
(0.23)
-0.22
(0.59)
0
(0.227)
-0.222
(0.299)
Liability (a) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Change in Ownership
(b)
0.042
(0.887)
0.698
(1.570)
“ “ “
Restructuring (c) 0.291
(3.753)*
1.854
(2.592)**
~
Change in Ownership
or Merger (d)
" " 0.036
(0.627)
0.643
(1.310)
“
~
All Reasons Except
Ownership, mergers
and Liability (e)
0.091
(1.453)
0.682
(1.252)
All Reasons Except
Liability (f)
" “ “ 0.058
(1.161)
0.659
(1.533)
LN (market Value /
Total Assets)
-0.078
(2.547)**
-0.562
(1.961)***
-0.084
(2.3)**
-0.634
(2.007)***
-0.084
(2.3)**
-0.634
(2.036)**
Number of firms 37 37 37 37 37 37
F Statistic for
Regression
(6.657)* (3.737)** (2.154) (1.737) (2.864)*** (2.682)***
R Squared
Adjusted
37.70%
(32.00%)
25.40%
(18.60%)
16.40%
(8.80%)
13.60%
(5.80%)
14.40%
(9.40%)
13.60%
(8.50%)
Two Tailed Significance
* Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 10% level.
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Table 4.17: Market Reaction (CARs) to Directors Resignations - Other
Announcements at Time of Resignations (Total Sample)
Panel A: Portfolios based on Other Events surrounding the director's resignation
#of ft P- ft in ft in
Other Events Firms Mean z Negative Value median 84-86 88-90
None 40 1.10% 0.4 22 0.64 -1.00% 25 14
Changes in Management 19 -0.10% 1.33 10 0.99 -0.20% 8 10
Changes in Ownership 18 4.20% 2.29** 6 0.24 2.90% 5 11
Financial Information 9 -3.00% 1.35 6 0.51 -5.50% 3 5
Earnings 5 -3.00% 0.34 2 0.99 0.70% 2 0
Other 11 -3.10% 2.11** 7 0.55 -3.50% 4 5
Panel B: Aggregated Portfolios based on Other Events surrounding the director's
resignation
#of ft P- ft in ft in
OtherEvents Firms Mean z Negative Value median 84-86 88-90
Eamings+Fin. Info. 12 -2.60% 1.32 7 0.77 -5.30% 4 5
Changes in Man. and 31 1.10% 0.03 15 0.99 1.60% 10 18
Owner.
All Other Events 46 -0.60% 0.89 23 0.99 0.30% 16 23
Panel C: Comparison of Aggregated Portfolios
Diff. in Diff. in t-Test Mann- Kolmog
Mean Median Whitney Smirov
None vs. Rest of Sample -1.70% 1.30% 0.569 0.147 0.913
Changes in Ownership vs. Rest of Sample -5.10% -4.40% 1.427 2.250** 5.662
Earnings + Financial Info. vs. Rest of Sample 3.20% 5.10% 0.766 1.321 4.405
Chan, in Man. and Owner vs. Rest of Sample -1.30% -2.80% 0.441 1.129 2.033
Panel D: Portfolio of Firms where the CEO, President or COB resigned in
addition to board members
ft of ft P- ft in ft in
Other Events Firms Mean z Negative Value median 84-86 88-90
CEO, President or COB 25 -3.30% 3.41* 16 0.23 -1.70% 9 13
Resign
Panel E: Comparison of Portfolio of Firm's officer resigned in addition to board
members with Rest of Sample
Diff. in Diff. in t-Test Mann- Kolmog
Mean Median Whitney ■Smirov
CEO, Pres, or COB Resign vs. Rest of Sample 5.00% 2.30% 1.559 1.374 2.988
* Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 10% level
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Table 4.18 Summary Table for Regressions - Other Events (Total Sample)
86 Firms, Dep<indent Vai
Mod
CARs
iables - C
Lei 1
CSPE
ARs, CSP
Moc
CARs
Es (t-stat
Lei 2
CSPE
in parenth
Moc
CARs
eses)
lei 3
CSPE
Intercept 0.003
(0.105)
-0.156
(0.702)
0.003
(0.153)
-0.089
(0.418)
0.011
(0.495)
-0.056
(0.237)
Change in Management -0.013
(0.352)
-0.407
(1.103)
_ '
Change in Ownership 0.05
(1.326)
0.833
(2.235)**
" " “ "
Financial Information
(other that Earnings)
Disclosed
-0.034
(0.685)
-0.407
(0.821)
Other Events -0.021
(0.464)
-0.222
(0.481)
" “
Changes in Ownership
and Management
" 0.012
(0.38)
0.135
(0.423)
_
All Financial Info.
Disclosure
-(0.031)
(0.723)
(0.714)
-(0.312)
“
All Other Events “ “ “ -0.017
(0.565)
-0.067
(0.221)
LN (market Value /
Total Assets)
0.003
(0.143)
0.015
(0.066)
0.003
(0.116)
0.041
(0.177)
0.001
(0.033)
0.021
(0.093)
Number of firms 86 86 86 86 86 86
F Statistic for
Regression
(0.584) (1.453) (0.241) (0.252) (0.160) (0.029)
R Squared
Adjusted
3.50%
(0.00%)
8.30%
(2.60%)
0.00%
(0.00%)
0.00%
(0.00%)
0.40%
(0.00%)
0.00%
(0.00%)
Two Tailed Significance
* Statistically significant at the 1% level,
**
at the 5% level, *** at the 10% level.
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Table 4.19 Summary Table for Regressions - Other Events for the Crisis Period
(1984-1986 Sample)
41 Firms, Dep<indent Vai
Mod
CARs
'iables - C
lei 1
CSPE
ARs, CSP
Moc
CARs
Es (t-stat
lei 2
CSPE
in parenth
Mot
CARs
eses)
lei 3
CSPE
Intercept -0.014
(0.815)
-0.276
(1.179)
-0.017
(0.929)
-0.309
(1.322)
-0.011
(0.549)
-0.205
(0.837)
Change in Management -0.043
(1.138)
0.528
(1.060)
- -
Change in Ownership 0.114
(2.571)**
1.153
(1.963)***
- ”
Financial Information
(other that Earnings)
Disclosed
-0.084
(1.594)
-0.742
(1.059)
Other Events -0.017
(0.364)
-0.53
(0.859)
-
Changes in Ownership
and Management
- 0.023
(0.646)
0.022
(0.049)
- -
AH Financial Info.
Disclosure
~ -0.062
(1.284)
-0.641
(1.028)
All Other Events - - - - -0.024
(0.783)
-0.477
(1.254)
LN (market Value /
Total Assets)
0.089
(4.063)*
0.712
(2.45)**
0.087
(3.658)*
0.653
(2.13)**
0.08
(3.433)*
0.587
(1 999)***
Number offirms 41 41 41 41 41 41
F Statistic for
Regression
(5.244)* (2.471)*** (5.269)* (2.075) (7.085)* (3.47)**
R Squared
Adjusted
42.80%
(34.70%)
26.10%
(15.50%)
29.90%
(24.30%)
14.40%
(7.50%)
27.20%
(23.30%)
15.40%
(11.00%)
Tw o Tailed Significance
* Statistically significant at the 1% level,
**
at the 5% level, ***at the 10% level.
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Table 4.20 Summary Table for Regressions - Other Events For the Post-crisis
Period( 1988-1990 Sample)
37 Firms, Deptindent Vai
Mod
CARs
iables - C
lei 1
CSPE
ARs, CSP
Mod
CARs
Es (t-stat
lei 2
CSPE
in parenth
Moc
CARs
eses)
lei 3
CSPE
Intercept 0.011
(0.995)
0.133
(.383)
0.037
(0.95)
0.176
(0.516)
0.049
(1.12)
0.143
(0.375)
Change in Management -0.013
(0.211)
-0.174
(0.342)
- -
“
Change in Ownership -0.003
(0.048)
0.514
(1.022)
- “
Financial Information
(other that Earnings)
Disclosed
-0.018
(0.231)
0.553
(0.813)
Other Events -0.035
(0.425)
0.231
(0.327)
- - -
"
Changes in Ownership
and Management
- - -0.009
(0.183)
0.206
(0.48)
All Financial Info.
Disclosure
-
- -0.029
(0.403)
-0.4
(0.635)
All Other Events - " -0.031
(0.611)
0.104
(0.236)
LN (market Value /
Total Assets)
-0.073
(1.84)***
-0.57
(1.688)
-0.073
(1.979)***
-0.503
(1.588)
-0.071
(1.956)***
-0.537
(1.697)***
Number offirms 37 37 37 37 37 37
F Statistic for
Regression
(0.853) (0.856) (1.433) (1.157) (2.316) (1.440)
R Squared
Adjusted
12.10%
(0.00%)
12.10%
(0.00%)
11.50%
(3.50%)
9.50%
(1.30%)
12.00%
(6.80%)
7.80%
(2.40%)
Two Tailed Significance
* Statistically significant at the 1% level,
** at the 5% level, *** at the 10% level.
Chapter 5: The Resolution of the Liability Crisis - Poorly
Performing and Healthy Firms
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4 evidence is presented in support of the idea that a directors
liability crisis did indeed occur. The resignations of directors during the 1984 to
1987 period elicit a negative shareholderresponse, a response that is significantly
different than that for resignations that occur during a period of time following the
crisis. This is especially true for firms that are performing poorly. This chapter is
concerned with the valuation effects of the resolution of this crisis. If a crisis that
had negative impact of shareholder wealth did occur, then its resolution should
elicit a positive market reaction.
In July of 1986 Delaware passed legislation that permitted corporations to
eliminate their directors' liability for breach of fiduciary duty. This legislation in
effect had the potential to significantly alleviate the director crisis. Indeed, most
states followed Delaware's lead and enacted similar legislation, and insurance
companies stabilized prices and relaxed some of the restrictions on D&O liability
policies. This chapter examines shareholders' response to corporate decisions to
adopt a provision to the firm's charter that eliminates the directors' liability
(Liability Limitations Provision (LLP)) in accordance with the Delaware law. In
a sense the event examined is that which allows the firm to shield itself from the
liability crisis. In addition to examining shareholders reaction in aggregate, the
chapter also looks at the differences between the reactions of shareholders of
healthy firms versus those in firms in financial distress.
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In the aggregate, shareholders appear to view changes in the external
governance structure (adoption of LLPs) as benign. However, on a firm-specific
level, the market reaction is clearly different between firms, and is related to firm
performance. We find that there is an inverse relationship between the market
excess returns and performance. Our results suggest that the market views
changes in the board of directors' external governance environment (the adoption
of LLPs) as being more important to poorly performing firms than to
normal/healthy firms. We provide potential explanations for this finding.
Section 5.2 provides a more detailed discussion of the legislation that
permitted firms to adopt LLPs. Section 5.3 examines the likely consequences to
the firm of these provisions and develops hypotheses regarding shareholders
response to these adoptions. The data collection and descriptive statistics are
discussed in section 5.4. Results for the various tests and the methodology used
are presented in section 5.5. Section 5.6concludes the discussion with a summary
and closing remarks.
5.2 STATUTORY LAWS REDUCING DIRECTOR LIABILITY
As described in Chapter 2, the liability crisis that occurred in the mid
1980 s made it difficult for firms to attract qualified directors to their boards.
Shareholders, on the one hand gained increased access to the courts and increased
awards in their suits against their directors yet on the other hand suffered the
consequences of loosing directors and not being able to replace them with
qualified candidates. Thus, the balance between the shareholders' rights to hold
directors liable for their actions and the need for attracting qualified directors was
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disturbed. Without this balance firms suffered the possibility of serious
disruptions in director monitoring and guidance, as directors became focused on
their potential liability rather than on the best interests of the firm.
In response to the liability crisis, and in an attempt to strike a new balance
between shareholder rights and maintaining stability on the board, several state
governments passed legislation limiting director-liability. These laws narrow the
scope of what directors can be held liable for. Two of the most popular forms of
legislation introduced are charter-option statutes and self-executing statutes.
Indemnification provisions have also been adopted in most states.
The first charter-option statute, was signed by the Governor of the State of
Delaware on June 18, 1986, as an amendment to section 102 of the Delaware
General Corporate Law to add a new subsection (b)(7) . The amendment became
effect July 1, 1986 and permits a Delaware corporation to include in its certificate
of incorporation a provision limiting or eliminating a director's personal liability
to the corporation or its stockholders for breach of his or her fiduciary duty of care
as a director in certain circumstances. The new section 102(b)(7) was intended to
assist Delaware corporations attract and retain highly qualified individuals to
serve as directors. [R. F. Balotti and M.J. Gentile (1987)]. Similar charter
amendments were subsequently adopted by at least thirty other states.
These statutes effectively eliminate directors' liability to stockholders for
monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty, with certain exemptions. These
exemptions are usually for breach of loyalty to the corporation or its shareholders,
acts performed not in good faith or that constitute intentional misconduct, and
illegal activities. Thus, directors are protected against claims by shareholders for
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gross negligence in performing their duties. Since, according to the Wyatt survey,
47% of all claims against directors and officers, originate with shareholders, this
is substantial protection.
Charter-option statutes require shareholder approval for limiting directors'
liability. Shareholders must thus vote to amend their corporate state charter to
include these limitations that do not protect directors from lawsuits filed by non-
shareholders. A few states (Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, and New Jersey), have
allowed these liability limitations to include acts of officers in addition to
directors. These provisions were adopted by corporations with the explicit intent
of retaining their existing directors and attracting new qualified directors in a
highly litigated environment were directors' and officers' liability is either not
available or extremely expensive.
The adoption of provisions limiting directors' liability is identified
explicitly in proxy statements. The case of Outboard Marine Corporation is
typical: Its proxy statement of Jan. 15, 1987 states:
"Management believes that the proposed amendments (limitations
of liability and indemnification) are desirable in order for the
Corporation to be able to continue to attract and retain responsible
individuals to serve as its directors, officers, and agents in light of
the present difficult environment in which such persons,
particularly directors, must serve. In recent years investigations,
claims, actions, suits or proceedings (including derivative actions)
seeking to impose liability on, or involving as witnesses, directors
and officers of publicly held corporations have become
increasingly common....Compounding the problem, however, has
been the increasing difficulty and expense of obtaining directors'
and officers' liability insurance..."
In contrast to the charter-option statutes, states adopting self-executing
statutes (Indiana, Ohio, Florida, Wisconsin, and Maine), do not require
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shareholder approval of the liability limitations specified above; they are
automatically applied.
In addition to limiting the liability of directors, some states have expanded
the corporation's ability to indemnify its officers and directors against all
monetary damages and legal costs incurred from suits brought against them.
These indemnification provisions, which must be approved by shareholders, allow
for the use of stockholders' funds (the corporation's cash) to pay stockholders and
lawyers in the event of a legal battle. Thus, in essence, stockholders pay the
expenses themselves and the lawyers appear to be the only party to gain from the
process. In cases where third parties sue managers or directors, it is stockholders
that ultimately pick up the tab.
The relevant question at this juncture is whether the limitation of director
liability and the institution of indemnification provisions achieve the appropriate
balance between shareholder rights and increased security for directors.
Shareholders themselves have provided some answers to this question. Liability
limitation provisions have been adopted by large numbers of corporations,
winning large majorities of shareholder votes. However, since shareholders rarely
vote against management, the true attitude of shareholders towards these
provisions, as well as towards indemnification provisions must be measured by
the market's response to their adoption.
Bhagat, Brickley, and Coles [1987] find that shareholder wealth is not
negatively effected by the adoption of indemnification clauses or by the purchase
of D&O liability insurance by the corporation. In order to determine the effect on
shareholder wealth of the liability limitation provision adopted by Delaware,
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Janjigian and Bolster [1990] test the returns on a group of Delaware firms around
the date of the legislature's adoption of the charter option statues in 1986. They
find no statistically significant response to the passage of the statute, although a
control group of non-Delaware corporations did somewhat better during this
period than the Delaware group. In addition, they test the market's response to
individual firms adopting the limitation of liability provision and find no
significant reaction on either the proxy mailing date or the shareholders meeting
date. They conclude that director liability-limitation does not significantly affect
shareholders' wealth. Netter and Poulsen [1989] reaffirm these results. They find
no significant negative reaction to shareholder wealth when liability-limitation
provisions are adopted. It should be noted that following the adoption of the
Delaware statute, the number of corporations reincorporating in Delaware rose by
28% [Cottingham (1988)]. Netter and Poulsen [1989] find that these
corporations' decision to reincorporate in Delaware had no adverse effect on
shareholder wealth.
Thus, it can be concluded that on average, limiting the liability of directors
has no significant negative effect on shareholders' wealth while at the same time it
provides the necessary protection that allowed directors to return and serve on
corporate boards. This paper affirms the results of Netter and Poulsen [1989], and
of Janjigian and Bolster [1990], with a larger and more diverse sample. More
importantly, however, it extends these results to show that the wealth-effects
arising from the adoption of liability-limitation provisions, are different for firms
with different performance.
99
The sample in this study differs from that used by Janjigian and Bolster
which includes only Delaware firms, by including close to 50% non-Delaware
firms. Netter and Poulsen's sample is also limited to S&P 500 firms, and only
includes firms that indemnify directors without limiting their liability. In contrast,
this sample includes firms of various sizes as well as firms that only limit the
directors' liability. Our sample is also larger than those used in these two studies.
Both previous studies limit themselves to event study methodology. This paper
starts with an event study, but the emphasis is on cross-sectional regressions that
examine the CARs in light of firm-specific characteristics.
5.3 The potential implications of adopting LLPs
In voluntarily adopting LLPs, shareholder give up their right to discipline
their directors for breach of fiduciary duty. However, LLPs may lower outside
directors' costs associated with serving on the board thus, increasing the firms
ability to retain and attract high quality outside directors. The relative importance
of these two alternative effects is an open question.
Previous studies (Janjigian and Bolster [1990] and Netter and Poulsen
[1989]) have documented that the adoption of LLPs is not associated with
significant stock price changes. This is consistent with the argument that
shareholders, on average, view the adoption of LLPs as an equal trade-off
between the loss of shareholder rights and increased protection for directors.
Unfortunately, the analysis adopted by these studies is limited in that it
ignores that the trade-off might be dependent on firm specific characteristics.
More specifically, the legal liability faced by directors of financially distressed
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firms is generally considered to be greater than for directors in successful firms
[see, for example, Brown (1991)] leading to the possibility that the protection
offered by LLPs, is more valuable to poorly performing firms. Directors in such
firms face an environment that is at best ambiguous regarding their role and
responsibilities. As discussed in Chapter 3 financial distress alters the rules and
regulations governing board behavior and traditional governance principles may
not apply. In addition, the fact that the firm is in distress implies that shareholders
are likely to have suffered significant losses, making a lawsuit more likely and
costly than for firms not financially distressed. This higher liability, coupled with
the increased litigation of the mid-1980s had the potential effect of significantly
increasing the costs of serving as a director on the board of a poorly performing
firm.
In addition, Chapter 3 discusses the relative importance of outside
directors to firms in financial distress. This importance is derived from their
contribution to the dynamics of the board, as well as their strategic importance
during financial distress. Therefore, shareholders' adoption of LLPs cannot be
explained solely from the perspective of the outside directors' cost of serving on
the board. Implicitly we are assuming that there are advantages to having outside
directors on the board. While these advantages probably exist for all firms, the
expanded power and added responsibilities of directors of financially distressed
firms may enhance their
value to shareholders. Hermlain and Weisbach (1988)
find that in firms performing poorly inside directors are replaced by new outside
directors and that for poorly performing firms the ability to attract new directors is
important. Evidence on the relationship between good performance and outside
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directors is contained in the Karpoff-Rice (1989) study of ANSCA firms (firms
established under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971). These firms
were not allowed to have outside directors and this is one factor contributing to
their poor performance. Outside directors are also instrumental in replacing the
management responsible for the firm's weak condition (Weisbach (1988) finds a
higher correlation between CEO turnover and performance for those firms in
which outsiders dominate the board.)
In addition, as discussed in Chapter 3, the existence of outside directors on
boards of companies in distress may make it easier for these companies to sell the
firm or privately refinance it, thereby avoiding the costs associated with
bankruptcy. Thus, directors are significant players in the attempt of poor
performing firms to survive. LLPs, by reducing the threat of directors' personal
liability, can not only reduce the costs associated with serving on the board but
also possibly facilitate a more efficiently functioning board.
Alternatively, if the directors on the board are ineffective,
providing them with additional protection might have negative implications for
the firm's future, especially for poorly performing firms. Such boards would
become more insulated from shareholders, and less likely to work in their best
interests. Because of the above mentioned importance, and increased
responsibilities of directors in financially distressed firms, the effect of the boards
insulation could be especially detrimental to shareholders of such firms. If this
were true, we would expect shareholders of poorly performing firms to react
negatively to the adoption ofLLPs.
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We contend that the market's reaction to the adoption of LLPs depends on
firm-specific characteristics, specifically financial performance. Firms adopting
LLPs alter the governance structure in a way that potentially increases the board's
ability to function. Although boards in both healthy and poorly performing firms
face the threat of personal legal liability, the implications for firm value of
adopting LLPs is not the same in both cases. Thus,
HI: Shareholders of low-performance firms value the protection offered to
directors by LLPs more than do shareholders of high-performance
firms.
All corporations in our sample adopted LLPs to the full extent of the state
law but some limitations included additional protection to both directors and
officers in the form of indemnification. While LLPs protect directors from
shareholders' suits, indemnification protects them against all suits including third-
party suits. In addition, most provisions expanded the indemnification protection
to include officers. Thus, the issue of indemnification, along with limitation of
liability, poses potentially senous problems to shareholders.
Nine firms in our sample chose to limit the liability of officers and
directors. Shareholders in these firms are thus deprived of a tool for disciplining
managers and directors. They also lose the ability to be reimbursed for losses they
may suffer due to managerial mismanagement. In addition, there is no clear
offsetting benefit since there was no "officers' crisis"; that is, officers were not
resigning or refusing to take jobs due to the D&O liability crisis. We expect
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therefore that the adoption by firms of provisions limiting officers' liability will
detract from any positive value the provisions have when limited to directors.
To include the limitation-data in cross-sectional regressions, LLPs are
coded in the following manner:
Type 1 LLPs: those limiting the liability of directors only.
Type 2 LLPs: those limiting the liability of directors and expanding the
indemnification of directors and officers.
Type 3 LLPs: those limiting the liability of directors and officers, and expanding
the indemnification of directors and officers.
Our hypothesis regarding these provisions is thus:
H2: Ceteris paribus, the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are inversely
related to the LLP-type: type 1 should be perceived by the market as
the most valuable and type 3 as the least.
An additional element that may determine the specific nature of the
provision adopted by the firm is its state of incorporation. While in most cases
the statutes adopted by the various states allowing for the elimination of director
liability are very similar, they are not exactly the same. Thus, an attempt is made
in our tests to control for any possible state-specific effects.
The number of outsiders on a corporation's board and their ownership
stake can influence shareholders' reaction to the adoption of a provision limiting
director-liability. The value added by the adoption of such a provision is the
ability to retain whatever number of outside directors are already on the board.
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The question is whether the value that shareholders place on the presence of
outside directors is related to the number (or percentage) of outsiders on the
board. If there are already a large number of outsiders, director resignations or the
inability to attract new outside directors will not necessarily have a major effect
on the outside directors' influence as a group. Thus, one would expect an inverse
relationship between shareholders' response to the firm's adoption of directors'
liability-limiting provisions and the percentage of outsiders on the board.
An ambiguity exists regarding the effect of outside directors' stock
ownership on shareholders' response. If outsiders have a substantial stake in the
firm, this provides them with the incentive to remain on the board even with the
risks of increased liability. In this case, the provision limiting the directors'
liability is less valuable. On the other hand, ownership of stock by outside
directors aligns their interests with those of shareholders, thus increasing the
directors' value. This increased value of outside directors would increase the
value of the liability-limiting provision. Thus, no unambiguous hypothesis can be
derived.
Analyzing the effect insiders' ownership has on shareholders' response to
the adoption of this provision is equally complex. As insider ownership in the
firm increases, the agency costs between insiders and shareholders are reduced
(convergence of interest hypothesis) [Jensen and Meckling (1976)]. If the role of
outside directors is primarily that of monitoring, then we would expect that their
value will increase as the agency costs between insiders and shareholders
increase. However, the more recent literature has pointed out potentially
offsetting costs associated with increased ownership: insiders increasingly
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entrench themselves as their ownership stake increases (the entrenchment
hypothesis) [Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983)]. It is perhaps because
of these offsetting forces that the relation between ownership by all officers and
directors and Tobin's q is non-linear [Morck, Shliefer, and Vishny (1988)]. Given
this finding, and because outside directors serve to reduce monitoring costs, the
value of outside directors would also be expected to be non-linear in relation to
the ownership stake of insiders. Unfortunately, our data sample is not large
enough (or varied enough) to permit a test of this hypothesized non-linearity.
Thus, we limit ourselves to testing for a possible linear relation between insider
ownership and the value shareholders place on outside directors. That is, we are
testing only the monitonng value of outside directors under the assumption of the
convergence of interest hypothesis (as insider ownership increases, their interests
converge with those of stockholders and the importance of the monitoring
performed by outside directors is reduced). Under these assumptions, we would
expect to find that,
H3: There is an inverse relation between the value shareholders place on
outside directors and the level of insiders' stock-ownership.
5.4 THE DATA AND SAMPLING PROCEDURES
5.4.1 Identification of the Relevant Firms
Using Lexis/Nexis, Disclosure, S &P News Retrieval Service, we search
and identify 182 firms that included a LLP clause in their proxy statements
between July 1986-December 1988. The on-line databases are also used to
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confirm that the proxy statement contains the first announcement of the boards'
intention to adopt a LLP. For all of these 182 firms the proxy statement is, in fact,
the first announcement of the firm's intentions.
From this group we omit firms: a) not appearing in the NBER database
(discussed below), b) not having daily returns on CRSP, c) not having proxy
statements and d) those adopting self-executing statutes. Firms executing self-
executing statutes were deleted because the LLPs for these firms went into effect
immediately after their state legislatures adopted them and not at the time of the
proxy announcements. Omitting 62 firms for one or more of these reasons, we
are left with a final sample of 120 firms that are then analyzed.
5.4.2 Tobin's q and Operating Performance Measures
One proxy for firm performance is Tobin's q. This "stock" measure of
performance embodies (capitalizes) investors' expectations of future performance.
A firm with a high q has economic rents and can avoid financial shortfalls by
raising fresh capital. Low-q firms have little (and perhaps even negative) rents and
this can spell financial problems leading possibly to financial distress.
Tobin's q is computed using the Manufacturing Sector Master File, 1959-
1987, published by NBER. This database uses inflation-adjusted values as
proxies for replacement costs and adjusts the book values of long-term debt for
the debts' age structure using a methodology similar to that of Lindenberg and
Ross (1981) and developed by Hall (1990). By using the market value of equity
and proxies for the value of debt and preferred stock, the database provides both a
market value proxy and a replacement cost proxy for over 2500 manufacturing
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lirms, with one to twenty-nine years of data each. The database allows for a
relatively simple calculation of Tobin's q, although it limits the analysis to
manufacturing firms (SIC codes between 2000 and 3999). However,
manufacturing firms allow for a wide diversity in values of q. Tobin's q is
calculated for each firm in the sample based on its market value and replacement
cost of assets at the end of the year preceding the proxy mailing.
As an alternative specification of performance, we employ the operating
performance "flow measures" used by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990). Firms
with 5 years of positive "bottom line" income and pre-tax operating income are
considered firms with high operating performance. Firms with three years of
negative net "bottom line" income or negative pre-tax operating income during
the five years preceding the proxy year are defined as firms with low operating
performance. A net "bottom line" loss occurs when Compustat Item 18 (income
before extraordinary items and discontinued operations) plus Item 48
(extraordinary items and discontinued operations) is less than zero. A pre-tax
operating loss exists when Item 13 (operating income before depreciation) minus
item 14 (depreciation expense) is less than zero. Earnings information required to
derive these performance measures and information on the size of the firms in our
sample are also available from the NBER data base.
As an additional accounting performance measure, operating profits to
total assets, adjusted for industry by subtracting the mean value for the
corresponding two-digit SIC code for the firm's industry, is used. This is a
measure of the firms current operating performance. Since a firm's performance
is often evaluated in comparison to the performance of similar firms, the
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adjustment for industry is made in order to control for possible industry wide
effects. The operating performance measure is calculated for the year preceding
the adoption of an LLP.
5.4.3 Confounding Events in Proxy Statements
Proxy statements are further analyzed to learn more about a) the LLP-
type, b) the ownership stakes of inside and outside directors and c) other
potentially confounding events.
Our event date is the mailing of a proxy statement. Proxy statements
contain other amendments or information that may effect the shareholders'
response to its mailing. In general, we consider any provision or announcement,
except for the announcement of director elections and the approval of an auditor,
as a confounding event. Our goal is to control for these confounding provisions
and to determine their effect, if any, on our results.
Each firm's proxy statement is carefully studied and the potentially
confounding provisions are identified. 54 firms were identified as having at least
one confounding provision. Of these 54 firms 18 had more than one confounding
event. Three main types of confounding provisions are identified:
Type 1 provisions: all announcements and provisions relating to stock option
plans, incentive plans, and managerial compensation (29 such firms). An
example from the proxy statement of Crane Co. (April 27, 1987) is:
"To
approve the amendment of the Company's 1984 Stock option Plan making
an additional 750,000 shares available for grant and certain technical
changes to reflect the 1986 Tax reform Act.
"
109
Type 2 provisions: all announcements authorizing the board to issue new stock
(28 such firms).These provisions are all very similar. An example from
the proxy statement of Avery International Corporation:
"To consider and
vote upon an amendment to the Company's Certificate ofIncorporation to
increase the number ofauthorized common shares which may be issued
from 100,000,000 to 200,000,000."
Type 3 provisions: all other announcements and provisions deemed to be
potentially confounding (17 such firms). This group includes: two firms
recommending the adoption of "fair price" provisions, four firms
announcing their intent to split their stock, two firms recommending the
re-classification of the board of directors, one case of a recommendation to
adopt a new investment plan, one announcement of a merger with the
firms subsidiaries, one case of an announcement of a repurchase plan, and
six other miscellaneous cases (provisions relating to preferred stock,
raising required vote for changes in by-laws, changes regarding
preemptive rights, elimination of stockholders' actions by written consent
and the elimination of a staggered board).
5.4.4 The Total Sample
The final 120 firm sample includes firms incorporated in 17 different
states with over 50% incorporated in Delaware (Table 5.1). Over the sample
period 14 of the proxies first announcing the planned adoption of LLPs were
mailed in 1986, 70 in 1987, and 36 proxies were mailed in 1988. As expected, the
month with the highest concentration of mailings was March, with 41 (34%) of
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the 120 proxies mailed during March 1987, and 19 (16%) mailed during March
1988.
Table 5.2 summarizes the data. Tobin's q for this sample ranges from a
low of 0.36 to a high of 6.0. The mean value of the qs in the sample is 1.46
(standard deviation: 0.9; median: 1.17). The median value and the clustering of
qs around unity are consistent with Tobin's hypothesis that in equilibrium firms
have a q-value close to one.
The mean percentage of outside directors in our sample is 61% (standard
deviation: 17%, median: 63%). We follow the taxonomy in Weisbach (1988) in
classifying directors: Inside directors are full time employees of the corporation,
outside directors are those directors who have no extensive business or personal
dealings with the corporation, and gray directors constitute the rest (have
extensive business or personal relationships with the corporation, but are not
employees).
The distribution of the percentage of outside directors sitting on boards of
corporations in this sample is similar to that in Weisbach (1988). Outside
directors in this sample hold very little if any ownership stake. On the other hand,
CEOs owned on average 6.1% of the stock of their corporations. CEO ownership
ranges from 0% to 71%.
Data on the book value of the firms total assets and the value of their
common stock are also contained in Table 5.2. Both variables are computed for
the end of the calendar year preceding the mailing of the proxy announcing the
LLP.
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5.4.5 Sub samples and their descriptive statistics
To further test our main hypothesis that a firm’s abnormal returns are
related to its performance we formed several additional sub samples. Descriptive
statistics for the sample as a whole and for some alternative sub sample are
presented in Table 5.3.
Samples defined bv q-ratios: To test for the effect of q-ratios on
abnormal returns we created two sub samples. In the first, we segmented the 120-
firm total sample into two subsets, one containing firms with the 60 lowest q-
ratios [Low q(so%)], and the other with firms with the 60 highest qs [High
q(so%)]. The second set contains a subset of the 30 firms with the lowest qs
[Low q (25%)] and a subset with the 30 firms with the highest qs [High q(25%)].
The High q (50%) sample has a mean q of 2.04, while the sample of low-q
(50%) firms has a mean q of 0.9. In other aspects the samples are somewhat
different; for example, the ownership by all officers and directors is higher for
low-q firms than it is for high-q firms (statistically significant at the 10% level).
Samples defined bv performance: We form two sub samples: high
performance firms (HOP) and low performance firms (LOP) using the DeAngelo
& DeAngelo (1990) measures of performance. The 120 firms in the sample
contain 66 HP firms and 16 LP firms.
The LOP firms have a smaller percentage of outside directors than HOP
firms. However, the percentage ownership by all officers and directors is larger
forLOP firms.
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Samples defined by performance and q: To better distinguish between the
implications of our performance specifications, we construct four samples: high-q
firms with high operating performance (HQHP), high-q firms with low operating
performance (HQLP), low-q firms with high operating performance (LQHP), and
low-q firms with low operating performance (LQLP). We define high q as q-ratios
above the median value for the total sample and low q as q-ratios below the
median. The 66 HP firms and the 16 LP firms are then grouped into four
categories to reflect both q-ratios and operating performance. This classification
yields 43 HPHQ firms, 23 HPLQ firms, 3 LPHQ firms and 13 LPLQ firms.
For low-performance and/or low-q firms the percentage of outside
directors is lower than otherwise while the percentage of shares owned by all
officers and directors is higher. These differences are for the most part significant
at various levels when using a standard t-test and the Mann-Whitney and
Kolmogorov-Smirnov nonparametric tests. The possible effects of these
differences will be taken into account in the cross-sectional regressions described
subsequently.
Samples defined by confounding events: We designate the sample of 54
firms with potentially confounding events as the contaminated sample and the
sample of 66 firms without potentially confounding events as the uncontaminated
sample.
Both samples posses similar characteristics (see Table 5.3). Using a
standard t-test and various non-parametric tests we could not differentiate the two
samples based on q-ratios or ownership. The one difference between the samples
is size; the uncontaminated sample contains larger firms (as measured by Book
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Value of Assets) than does the contaminated sample. The mean Book Value of
Assets for the Uncontaminated and Contaminated firms is $4,584,000 and
$1,493,000 respectively. Using a standard t-test they are significantly different at
the 10% level (p = 0.076). Using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov nonparametric test
the samples are significantly different at the 5% level
Samples defined by percentage outside directors: Following Weisbach
(1988), we define a high percentage of outside directors as >60% and low as <
60%. The total sample of 120 firms contains 66 firms with high percentage
outside directors and 54 firms with low percentage outside directors.
The sub sample with a high percentage of outside directors has a mean of
72% outside directors while the sample with low percentage outside directors has
a mean of 46% outside directors. The Tobin's q for both samples is very similar.
Consistent with Weisbach [l9BB], the sample with low percentage of outside
directors on the board has a substantially higher level of ownership by officers
and directors than does the sample with a high percentage of outside directors.
5.5 Methodology and Results
5.5.1 Event Study
The methodology described in Chapter 4 section 4 is adopted. The total
sample and the various sub samples are examined using standard event study
methodology to determine shareholders' reaction to the adoption of LLPs. We use
the event study i) to determine the abnormal return over the total sample of 120
firms, ii) to determine the abnormal returns on various sub samples of firms and
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iii) to produce firm-specific cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and cumulative
standardized prediction errors (CSPEs) for use in the cross-sectional regressions
described later.
The date of the proxy mailing announcing that the LLP will be presented
for shareholder vote at the next shareholders' meeting is chosen as the event-day.
A period of 3 days following the event-date is chosen as the event-window and
abnormal returns for this period are estimated using an OLS market model. An
estimation period of 150 days prior to the event is used. Since regular shareholder
meetings and the mailing of proxy statements are an expected event, the expected
abnormal return around the mailing of the proxy statement is zero [Brickley
(1986)]. Thus, the null hypothesis for all our samples is that no abnormal market
reaction will occur surrounding the mailing.
Information regarding this event may leak before the proxy mailing [Linn
and McConnell (1983)]. However, we are unable to identify any news releases
before the proxy mailing or the dates for the actual meeting where the directors
adopted the amendment. It should be noted that even in the case studied by Linn
and McConnell, the results for the window around the proxy mailing date are
consistent with the results for the window that includes the earlier leakage.
Because of the uncertainty concerning the proxy mailing date, and to control for
the possibility of information leakage, an event studies over two additional and
larger windows (-30 days to +lO days and 0 to +lO days) are also conducted.
Results for these windows are similar to those conducted in the more narrow
window and are therefore not reported here.
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5.5.2 Results of the event study
Table 5.4 summarizes the results. The results for the total sample (120
firms) are consistent with earlier findings [Netter and Poulsen (1989) and
Janjigian and Bolster (1990)]. There is no evidence that the adoption of LLPs has
any negative effect on shareholder value. Any effect that does exist is positive,
yet not statistically significant.
The results for the samples of firms based on low performance, segmented
either by low-qs or by low operating performance, all show a positive wealth
effect associated with the adoption of LLPs for directors. All these samples
exhibit positive CARs that vary from 1.47% [for the low q (50%) sample] to
5.53% (for the LQLP sample) rejecting the null hypothesis of zero returns at a
statistically significant level of 5% or 1%. A sign test for the number of positive
returns in each sample provides further statistical evidence for this result. For the
samples of high performance firms the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns
cannot be rejected by any of our tests.
We also verified that this relationship between CARs and firm
performance is not due to spurious correlation. If poorly-performing firms have
poor stock performance during the market model estimation period we would
expect their regression alphas to be lower than those for healthy firms. This would
cause the abnormal returns to appear higher for the poorly-performing firms. This
possibility is no cause for concern here; our sample exhibits no significant
correlation between alphas and Tobin's q.
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Table 5.5 presents the differences in the excess returns between
corresponding sub samples to determine whether they are significantly different
from one other. In every comparison between high performance and low
performance samples there is a significant statistical difference at the 1% to 10%
level. We use three tests to establish the statistical significance of the difference
between the samples; an unpaired t-test, a Mann-Whitney unpaired z-statistic and
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample y} statistic. These results provide significant
evidence that investors in low- performance firms value LLPs more than
shareholders in high-performance firms.
The samples segmented by percentage of outside directors show no
significant return and no statistical evidence is present of a differential response
between the two samples. Thus, the percentage of outside directors does not
affect shareholders' response, and no relation between the percentage of outside
directors and the value shareholders place on the LLP can be established.
Even though the uncontaminated sample has a significant positive CAR
there is no significant difference between the contaminated and uncontaminated
samples, suggesting that confounding events are not responsible for our results.
5.5.3 Cross-sectional Regressions
To further examine any potential linkages between the value of the LLP
and firm-specific attributes we run several cross-sectional OLS regressions. The
dependent variable in these regressions is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR)
following the proxy mailing. Since our main hypothesis refers to the firm's
performance, Tobin's q and our other measures of performance are the
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independent variables. In addition, a number of controlling variables are used as
independent variables. Because of the potential for heteroscedasticity, each
stock's CSPE is used as a dependent variable along with it's CAR.
5.5.3.1 Firm Performance
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 summarize the results of nine cross-sectional
regressions examining the relation between performance and the market's
response to the mailing of a proxy statement announcing the firm's intention to
adopt a LLP. All nine regressions provide evidence suggesting the rejection, at
the 1% level, of the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the two.
In all the regressions in Table 6 the coefficient for Tobin's q is negative and
statistically significant. To verify that the results are not effected by the fact that
this variable is truncated at zero the natural log of Tobin's q was used instead of
Tobin's q producing the same results (not reported here). These results provide
statistical support for our hypothesis (HI) regarding the inverse relationship
between Tobin's q and CARs surrounding this event. This is also consistent with
the evidence from the event studies describedearlier.
Regression 2 through 5 in Table 5.6 provide evidence on the influence of
the DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) performance measures on shareholders'
response. The dummy variable LOP takes on the value of 1 for firms with at least
three years of negative performance in the five-year sample period. The dummy
variable HOP takes on the value of 1 for firms with 5 years of positive
performance in the five-year sample period. Regressions 2-5 suggest that the
firm's past performance has an influence on the value shareholders attribute to
118
LLPs aimed at enabling the board to function unimpeded by excessive lawsuits.
The coefficient for the LOP variable is positive and significant at the 1% level in
all four regressions. The coefficient for HOP, while positive, is much smaller and
only marginally significant in two of the four regressions. These results are
consistent with our hypothesis as well as with the results regarding Tobin's q.
They provide additional evidence that owners of poorly performing firms value
the protection offered to their boards more than owners of firms that are doing
well.
The LOP variable is likely to be proxying fora similar effect as Tobin's q.
The mean and median values for Tobin's q of the 16 firms with negative
performance are statistically significantly lower than for the sample as a whole
(mean: 1.031; median: 0.71; Std: 0.862) based both on a standard t-test and on the
nonparametric Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. In addition, these
averages are influenced by an outlier, one firm with a q of 4.0 and yet having a
negative return. Furthermore, there is collinearity between the q variable and the
dummy variable LOP. A regression with the q-ratio as the dependent variable and
the dummy variable as the independent variable is statistically significant at the
5% level. The q-ratio and the dummy variable are thus linearly related; the t-
statistics are biased downwards and are highly sensitive to sample size and
composition.
Regressions 1-4 in Table 5.7 show that firms with both low q-ratios and
LOP have a positive reaction to the adoption of LLPs. Firms with both
performance measures particularly low are in an especially poor condition and are
prime candidates for financial distress. Thus, it is entirely plausible that it is the
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value attributed to the boards' ability to take on risks and act effectively in
financial distress that explains these results.
Table 5.8 provides additional evidence regarding the relationship between
performance and shareholders' response to the adoption of LLPs. In addition to
the event window used in the regressions in tables 5.6 and 5.7, results for event
windows spanning the 10 days following and from 30 days before to 10 days after
the announcement of adoption of an LLP, are presented. Table 8 also presents
results for an additional performance variable; operating performance divided by
total assets. Model 1 and 2 provide evidence that Tobin's q's significance is
dependent on the event window chosen. However, the LOP variable is significant
at the 1% or 5% and positive for all event windows. This provides further
evidence of the relationship between performance and shareholders response to
LLPs. Models 3 and 4 provide future evidence of this relationship using a
different performance measure. Operating income over total assets is, as
hypothesized, negative and significantly related to CARs for all three event
windows. When adjusted for industry, the result remains for the (0,3) and (-
30,+10) windows but not for the (o,+ 10) event window. These results confirm the
relationship between performance and CARs
The results in tables 5.6 and 5.7 are robust to the varying control variables
used in the regressions. The next two sections discuss their significance.
5.5.3.2 Nature ofthe LLP
Regressions 3 and 5 in Table 5.6 and 2 and 4 in Table 5.7 test H2.
Although the sign for the coefficient of the provision variable is negative as
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hypothesized, it is not statistically significant. An alternative methodology was
used to verify these results, in which the provisions variable was replaced by two
dummy variables for the indemnification clause and for the inclusion of officers
in the limitations of liability provision. The results are similar to those presented
in Tables 5.6 and 5.7. Both coefficients are negative but not statistically
significant.
These results could be a consequence of the small number of firms in the
sample that limited the liability of both officers and directors (only 9 out of 120
firms). This evidence, that shareholders are not reacting differently to firms that
both indemnify and limit directors' liability is consistent with earlier findings
[Bhagat, Brickley, and Cole (1987)] that indemnification of directors is neither a
significant positive or negative event. Many firms had indemnification provisions
in place and these new provisions were, for the most part, extensions and
expansions of their existing indemnification agreements with managers and
directors.
To identify effects associated with the state of incorporation and possible
differences in provisions between states, regressions 3 and 5 in Table 5.6 and
regressions 2 and 4 in Table 5.7 contain a dummy variable, DEL, that takes on the
value of 1 if the firm is incorporated in Delaware and 0 otherwise. Delaware is
singled out because over 50% of the firms in the sample are incorporated there.
The coefficient for DEL is not significant and we conclude that incorporation in
Delaware at that time had no effect on shareholders' reaction to the limitation
placed on directors' liability.
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To control for possible effects from firm size, the natural log of each firm's
book value of total assets (in millions) is also used in these regressions. There is
no evidence to suggest that our results are related to firm size. The market value
of the firm's common stock when used as a proxy for size also leads to the same
conclusion.
5.5.3.3 Outside Director Representation and Ownership
To determine whether shareholders in firms having a large percentage of
outside directors value the provision limiting directors' liability more than other
firms with a lower percentage, the percent of outside directors is used as an
independent variable in regressions 4 and 5 in Table 5.6, and 3 and 4 in Table 5.7.
As discussed earlier, the expected value of the coefficient for this variable is
negative. Our results are consistent with those for the event study, and show no
relation between the percentage outside directors and the value shareholders place
on outside directors. A similarly insignificant result is obtained in these
regressions for the outside directors' ownership variable, suggesting that it is not
the number of outside directors on a given board or their ownership stake that
determines their value in this context, but possibly the characteristics of the firm
itself, of which q-ratio and operating performance are identified in this study.
The question of the influence of insider ownership on shareholders'
valuation of outside directors is addressed in regressions 4 and 5 in Table 5.6 and
3 and 4in Table 5.7. The coefficients for insider's ownership are always negative,
although not statistically significant, consistent with the expected negative
relationship under the convergence of interest hypothesis assumption. However,
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the coefficient for CEO ownership is indistinguishable from zero, suggesting no
effect. There are two potential explanations for this result: one, the need for
monitoring is not linearly related to CEO ownership [this argument is similar to
that presented in Morck, Shliefer, and Vishny (1988)] and two, shareholders are
valuing outside directors because of their guidance and not their monitoring
function. (To test for the non-linear relationship between insider ownership and
shareholders response to the adoption of provisions limiting director liability, a
larger sample than is available would be needed with more diversity in ownership
among insiders.) The options are not mutually exclusive and one would expect
that both are influencing our results.
In addition to the regressions described in Table 5.6 and 5.7, we attempted
to use other ownership variables such as ownership by all officers and directors,
and natural log transformations of the variables in these tables, as independent
variables. In all the different regressions we attempted, the ownership variables
are never statistically significant, while Tobin's q and the other low performance
variables retain their sign and significance.
5.5.3.4 Confounding Events
Table 5.9 duplicates regressions 1 and 4 in Table 5.7 for the
uncontaminated and contaminated samples. By examining the regression results
for these sub samples vve can establish whether our results are a consequence of
other events (other provisions and announcements in the proxy statements) or
primarily a result of the adoption of the LLPs. The results for the uncontaminated
sample in the regressions are very similar to the results obtained using the total
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sample. However, the contaminated sample shows no relationship between the
dependent and independent variables. These results, which are consistent with the
event study findings, lead us to believe that the existence of contaminating events
in the sub sample of firms does not effect our results in any significant manner.
An alternative method for determining the possible effects of confounding
provisions is to identify the existence of these events with a dummy variable and
to regress the CARs on this dummy variable and the performance variables used
in our other regressions. Our tests using this methodology (not reported here)
show that these provisions have no significant effect on the CARs, providing
furtherevidence that they are not influencing our results.
5.6 CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This chapter has documented an inverse relationship between the market's
reaction to firms' announcements of plans to adopt directors' liability-limitation
provisions and their financial condition as measured by either Tobin's q or
operating performance. While the adoption of these provisions are viewed as
insignificant by the shareholders of firms with high q and good performance, they
are perceived as very valuable for low-q and poor-performance firms. These
findings are consistent with the findings of earlier research documenting the
importance of the board of directors in under-performing firms. At least for
poorly performing firms, these provisions have contributed to restoring the
delicate balance between two forces: shareholders' need to hold the board of
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directors accountable for its actions on the one hand and, on the other, the board s
ability to function effectively without risking the personal wealth ol its members.
Table 5.1: State of Incorporation of Firms in the Sample
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While most states allowed firms to limit the liability of directorsonly, some states allowed for
provisions that limit the liability of officers and directors.
Number in Limitation of
State Sample Liability for:
DEL 61 Directors Only
NY 22 Directors Only
PA 9 Directors Only
MA 5 Directors Only
NJ 4 Directors & Officers
MD 3 Directors & Officers
MI 3 Directors Only
CA 3 Directors Only
NV 2 Directors & Officers
AZ 1 Directors Only
GA 1 Directors Only
IA 1 Directors Only
KA 1 Directors Only
MN 1 Directors Only
RI 1 Directors Only
TX 1 Directors Only
WA 1 Directors Only
Total 120
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Total Sample
Summary statistics on To
stock by outside directors
sample. Tobin's q, and da
the proxy statement. Owr
announcing the eliminatio
jin's q, size, percentage outside directors on the board, and ownership of
by all officers and directors, and by the CEO, for the 120 firms in the
ta on size are for the end of the calendar year preceding the mailing of
tership and board composition data is from the proxy statements
n of director liability. All proxies are from the period 1986-1988.
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev.
Tobin's q 1.46 1.17 0.36 6.00 0.907
Percent Outside
Directors
60.60% 62.50% 16.70% 91.70% 16.70%
Percent of Stock Owned
by Outside Directors
1.30% 0.09% 0.00% 32.10% 4.00%
Percent of Stock Owned
by All Officers and
Directors
11.20% 5.10% 0.10% 71.00% 13.70%
Percent of Stock
Owned by the CEO
6.10% 0.87% 0.00% 70.60% 11.50%
Book Value of Total
Assets (Mill.)
$3,193 $460 $11 $69,484 $9,504
Value of Common
Stock (Mill.)
$2,786 $408 $5 $68,959 $8,688
127
Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics for Alternative Samples
Mean statistics for a number of firm-specific variables. The statistics are provided for the total
sample and for the various sub samples. Tobin's q and data on size are for the end of the calendar
year preceding the mailing of the proxy statement. Ownership and board composition data is from
the proxy statements announcing the elimination of directors' liability. All proxies are from the
period 1986 -1988.
#Of Tobin’s % Outside % Own. BV
Firm Type Firms q Directors by All Off. of Assets
and Dir. (mill)
All 120 1.461 60.60% 11.20% $3,193
Low q (50%) 60 0.883 58.20% 13.50% $2,728
High q (50%) 60 2.039 62.90% 9.10% $3,659
Low q (25%) 30 0.707 56.4% 15.3% $3991
High q (25%) 30 2.695 65.3% 9% $3677
LOP 16 1.031 50.2% 19.6% $2006
HOP 66 1.749 60.9% 9.7% $4710
LQLP 13 0.734 48.0% 19.6% $2452
HQLP 3 2.319 59.3% 19.9% $70
LQHP 23 0.96 59.4% 11.5% $4877
HQHP 43 2.17 61.8% 8.7% $4620
Contaminated 54 1.433 62.7% 10.5% $1493
Uncontaminated 66 1.495 58.9% 12% $4584
High % Outside
Directors (>60%)
66 1.543 72.30% 6.30% $4,070
Low % Outside
Directors(<60 %)
54 1.36 46.20% 17.40% $2,122
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Table 5.4: Event Study Results - Excess Returns for Days (0,3)
Excess returns following the mailing of the proxy statement announcing the elimination of
directors’ liability for various sub samples, q-ratios are for the end of the calendar year preceding
the mailing of the proxy statement. Percentage of outside directors is from the proxy statements
announcing the elimination of directors' liability. Sample: 120 linns, between 1986 and 1988;
day zero is the day the proxy is mailed; z-statisticsare in parentheses.
Sample Mean Median Standard z Number
Firm Type Size Return Return Deviation Stat (a) Positive
Total Sample 120 0.77% 0.55% 4.528 1.588 67
Low q (50%) 60 1.47% 1.43% 5.369 2.153** 27***
High q (50%) 60 0.08% 0.014% 3.398 0.093 30
Low q (25%) 30 2.20% 1.547% 4.168 2.662* 20***
High q (25%) 30 -0.51% -0.73% 3.724 0.28 12
LOP 16 4.72% 4.487% 6.152 2.992* 14*
HOP 66 0.47% 0.208% 3.661 0.804 35
LQLP 13 5.53% 4.721% 6.489 3.209* 12*
HQLP 3 1.21% 0.482% 2.904 0.229 2
LQHP 23 1.15% 1.507% 3.925 0.978 13
HQHP 43 0.11% 0.011% 3.505 0.282 22
Contaminated 54 0.05% 0.102% 4.283 0.118 29
Uncontaminated 66 1.36% 1.114% 4.668 2.031** 38
High % Outside
Directors (>60%)
66 0.30% -0.053% 4.733 0.479 33
Low % Outside
Directors (<60%)
54 1.357% 1.32% 4.234 1.837*** 24***
* Statistically significant at the 1% level,
** at the 5% level, *** at the 10% level,
a. Constnicted using standardized returns; see Dodd and Warner (1983) for the definition
of this statistic.
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Table 5.5: Differences in Excess Returns Between Event Study Samples
Differences in excess returns following the mailing of the proxy statement announcing the
elimination of directors’ liability for a number of samples of firms. Differences in cumulative
standardized prediction errors were also compared with similar results as those for the CAR’s.
Tobin's q are for the end of the calendar year preceding the mailing of the proxy statement.
Percentage of outside directors is from the proxy statements announcing the elimination of director
liability. Sample: 120 finns, between 1986 and 1988.
Mean
Diff.
t-Test
Stat (a)
z
Stat (b)
c2
Stat. (c)
Low q(50%) - High q(50%) 1.39% 1.694*** 6.533**
Low q(25%) - High q(25%) 2.71% 2.654** 2.676** 8.067**
LOP - HOP 4.25% 3.593* 3.229* 15.647*
LOP - Total Sample less LOP
firms
4.55% 3.969* 3.505* 16.955*
LQLP - Total Sample less
LQLP firms
5.33% 4.293* 3.719* 18.347*
LQLP - High q (50%) 5.45% 4.357* 3.662* 16.388*
LQLP - HOP 5.06% 3.941* 3.491* 17.4*
LQLP - Low q(50%) less LQLP
firms
5.18% 3.334* 3.346* 16.766*
LQLP-LQHP 4.38% 2.53** 2.684* 13.557*
LQLP - HQHP 5.22% 3.958* 3.542* 15.832*
Contaminated -
Uncontaminated
1.31% 1.558 1.002 0.109
High - Low % Outside
Directors
1.06% 1.279 *** 0.178
Two Tailed Significance
* Statistically significant at the 1% level,
**
at the 5% level, ***at the 10% level.
a. Two-sample, two-tailed, unpaired t-test statistic.
b. Two-sample, unpaired Mann-Whitney z-statistic.
c. Two-sample, unpaired Kolmogorov-Smimov test statistic.
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Table 5.6: Cross-Sectional Regression Results - 1
Cross-sectional regression results establishing the relation between the cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs) and Tobin's q, and low operating performance. The dependent variables are the
CARs over a window of (0,3) surrounding the mailing of a proxy statement announcing the
elimination of directors’ liability. Regressions 2-4 contain various control variables, t-statistics
are in parentheses.
Regr-1 Regr-2 Regr-3 Regr-4 Regr-5
Tobin’s q -0.012
(2.61)*
-0.011
(2.45)**
-0.021
(2.39)**
-0.01
(2.08)**
-0.01
(2.08)**
LOP 0.05
(3.97)*
0.048
(3.61)*
0.048
(3.60)*
0.047
(3.38)*
HOP “ 0.015
(1.69)***
0.016
(1.64)
0.014
(1.59)
0.017
(1.67)***
Provisions -0.005
(0.77)
“ -0.003
(0.51)
DEL * 0.002
(0.27)
0.001
(0.14)
Ln (Total Assets) “ -0.001
(0.41)
-0.002
(0.74)
% Outside Directors on
Board
" ' -0.013
(0.47)
-0.009
(0.31)
% Shares Owned by
Outside Directors
“ “ ~ -0.032
(0.03)
-0.054
(0.50)
% Shares Owned by
Insiders less CEO
“ -0.101
(1.19)
-0.112
(1.20)
% Shares Owned by
CEO
" ~ 0.006
(0.15)
-0.004
(0.10)
F Statistic for
Regression
6.79* 7.79* 3.98* 3.485* 2.49*
R Squared 0.054 0.168 .174 .179 .186
Two Tailed Significance
* Statistically significant at the 1% level,
**
at the 5% level, *** at the 10% level.
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Table 5.7: Cross-Sectional Regression Results - 2
Cross-sectional regression results establishing the relation between the cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs) and firm performance as measured by a dummy variable combining Tobin's q with
a firm's income measure. The dependent variables are the CARs over a window of (0,3)
surrounding the mailing of a proxy statement announcing the elimination of directors’ liability.
Regressions 2-4 contain various control variables, t-statistics are in parentheses.
Regr.-l Regr.-2 Regr.-3 Regr.-4
LQLP 0.059
(4.32)*
0.056
(3.94)*
0.055
(3.67)*
0.054
(3.51)*
HQLP 0.016
(0.62)
0.012
(0.47)
0.024
(0.91)
0.021
(0.76)
LQHP 0.015
(1.35)
0.014
(1.17)
0.016
(1.42)
0.016
(1.33)
HQHP 0.005
(0.50)
0.006
(0.56)
.005
(0.48)
.007
(0.64)
Provisions -0.006
(0.84)
-0.003
(0.51)
DEL 0
(0.001)
0
(0.02)
Ln (Total Assets) -0.001
(0.32)
-0.002
(0.61)
% Outside Directors on
Board
-0.015
(0.56)
-0.011
(0.40)
% Shares Owned by
Outside Directors
-0.016
(0.15)
-0.033
(0.30)
% Shares Owned by
Insiders less CEO
-0.117
(1.32)
-0.123
(1.27)
°7c Shares Owned by
CEO
0.005
(0.13)
-0.00+
(0.09)
F Statistic for
Regression
5.072* 2.966* 2.718* 1.997**
R Squared .15 .156 .164 .169
Two Tailed Significance
* Statistically significant at the 1% level,
** at the 5% level, ***at the 10% level.
Table
5.8:
Cross
Sectional
Regression
Results
(For
Various
Performance
Measures
and
Various
Event
Windows)
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Cross-sectional
regression
results
establishing
the
relation
between
the
cumulative
abnormal
returns
(CARs)
and
various
performance
measures
The
dependent
variables
are
the
CARs
over
various
windows
surrounding
the
mailing
of
a
proxy
statement
announcing
the
elimination
of
directors’
liability,
t-statistics
are
in
parentheses.
Window
0,+3
Model
1
0,+10
-30,+10
0,+3
Model
2
0,+10
-30,+10
0,+3
Model
3
0,+10
-30,+10
0,+3
Model
4
0,+10
-30,+10
Tobin's
q
-0.016 (2.605)**
-0.01 (1.398)
-0.027 (1.688)***
-0.01
1
(2.451)**
-0.006 (0.805)
-0.019 (1.098)
-
-
-
-
*
*
LOP
-
-
-
0.049 (3.974)*
0.07 (3.682)*
0.107 (2.513)**
-
-
-
-
-
-
HOP
-
-
-
0.015 (1.685)***
0.003 (0.263)
0.008 (0.026)
-
-
-
-
-
-
OPINC/TA
-
-
-
-
-
-
-0.091 (1.658)***
-0.188 (2.417)**
-0.441 (2.575)**
-
-
-
Ind.
Adj.
(OPINC/TA)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-0.082 (1.885)***
-0.089 (1.427)
-0.278 (2.023)**
F
Statistic
6.785**
1.954
2.849***
7.794*
5.788*
3.377**
2.756***
5.844**
6.629**
3.554***
2.036
4.092**
R
Squared
5.40%
1.70%
2.20%
16.80%
13.20%
8.20%
250%
5.10%
5.70%
3.20%
1.80%
3.60%
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Table 5.9: Cross-Sectional Regression Results (Contaminated vs. Uncontaminated
Samples)
Cross-sectional regression results establishing the difference between a contaminated and
uncontaminated sample with regard to the relation between cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
and firm performance as measured by a dummy variable combining Tobin's q with a firm's income
measure (c). The dependent variables are the CARs over a window of (03) surrounding the
mailing of a proxy statement announcing the elimination of directors’ liability, t-statisticsare in
parentheses.
Regression 1 Regression 2
Contaminated Uncontaminated Contaminated U ncontaminated
LQLP 0.037 0.065 0.021 0.068
(1.56) (3.78)* (0.70) (3.42)*
HQLP 0.055 -0.007 0.03 -0.023
(1.25) (0.23) (0.44) (0.67)
LQHP 0.022 0.008 0.025 0.017
(1.33) (0.53) (1.23) (1.06)
HQHP 0.009 0 .009 .008
(0.66) (0.0) (0.60) (0.54)
Provisions 0.005 -0.011
(0.503) (1.15)
DEL -0.001 0.003
(0.10) (0.27)
Ln (Total Assets) -0.002
(0.44)
-0.004
(124)
% Outside Directors -0.051 0.021
on Board (0.86) (0.61)
% Shares Owned by -0.45
-0.065
Outside Directors (0.99) (0.56)
% Shares Owned by 0.014 -0.22
Insiders less CEO (0.06) (1.90)***
% Shares Owned 0.014
-0.059
By CEO (0.19) (111)
F Statistic for 1.121 4.446* .688 2.41**
Regression
R Squared .084 .226 .153 .329
Two Tailed Significance
* Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 10% level.
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Implications
This paper provides evidence that a directors liability crisis did indeed
occur in the mid 1980s. Shareholder's response to director resignations during the
crisis period are significantly more negative than their responses to similar events
after the crisis had ended. This difference in response results from the high cost
involved in replacing resigning directors due to the relative scarcity of qualified
directors during the crisis years.
The fact that the adoption of provisions limiting director liability, and thus
eliminating the so called director liability crisis, was viewed by shareholders of
many firms as a positive event, suggests that at least for these firms a crisis did
indeed exist. For no group of firms did the elimination of directors liability result
in a negative shareholder response. Thus, evidence is presented that legal liability
has an impact both on the governance of the firm and, as a result, on firm value.
When shareholders' responses to directors resignations are further
analyzed differences are found to exist between poorly performing and healthy
firms. These differences are also found to vary between the period of the crisis
and the period following it. During the crisis there is a positive correlation
between performance and shareholder response to the resignations. The market
thus views the resignations at poorly performing firms to be a more negative event
than the resignations at firms that are doing well. Directors in poorly performing
firms face a more litigious environment than their colleagues in healthier firms.
Thus, they are less likely to want to serve on boards of financially distressed
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firms. This is especially a problem for these firms because, as argued in this
study, firms approaching financial distress have a special need for qualified
independent directors. The more negative response to resignations from poorly
performing firms can be explained by the fact that these directors are especially
important to these firms and that because of the crisis they were especially hard to
replace.
During the period following the crisis, shareholders reverse their responses
to the resignations. During this period the relationship between the market's
response and firm performance is negative. Firms that are doing well are
penalized more for the loss of directors than poorly performing firms. Because
the crisis had ended, during this period finding directors to replace those who
resigned was not a problem. Thus, the resignation of directors from poorly
performing firms is viewed as a positive event; the directors who brought the firm
to its poor condition are being replaced with potentially more qualified directors.
For firms that are doing well however, the resignations could be a signal that
problems or conflicts exist for the firm. This is viewed as a negative signal by the
market.
This research also documents a strong inverse relationship between the
market's response to the adoption of provisions limiting directors liability and the
firm's performance as measured by either Tobin's q or operating performance.
While the adoption of liability-limitation provisions is viewed as insignificant by
the shareholders of firms with high q and good performance, they are perceived as
very valuable for low-q and poor-performance firms. This is consistent with the
other findings in this study and in earlier research that documented the importance
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of the board of directors (and especially its outside members) in under-performing
firms. It is also consistent with the notion that the liability crisis, which these
provisions sought to eliminate, effected poorly performing firms more strongly
than it did firms that were doing well.
By limiting directors' liability, firms have been able to attract qualified
directors to their boards. At least for poorly performing firms, these statutes
contributed to restoring the delicate balance between two forces: shareholders'
need to hold the board of directors accountable for its actions on the one hand
and, on the other, the board's ability to function effectively without risking the
personal wealth of its members.
The importance of these results is in providing further evidence as to the
importance of corporate governance, and more specifically the board of directors,
to firm value. External forces, such as the legal system, can have a serious and
significant effect on a firms value and should be taken into account when
attempting to explain shareholder and managerial behavior.
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